
















The Dissertation Committee for Brian Arnold Soeder Certifies that this is the 
approved version of the following dissertation: 
 
 



















A Trust Based Methodology for Determining Identity Risk 
 
by 





Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 





Dedicated to my wife Natalie for her unending support of my research and career. 






I would like to express my appreciation for all of my colleagues and professors.  
My company, the MITRE Corporation has given me the time and freedom to execute my 
research.  I would like to convey my gratitude to the entire family at the Program 
Executive Office for Command, Control and Communications Tactical, especially PM 
Mission Command for their patience as I finished my dissertation.    
I would like to thank the team in the Center for Identity.  I’d like to thank Suratna 
Budalakoti, Dave DeAngelis, and my advisor, Dr. Suzanne Barber for her confidence and 
trust.  A special thanks to Elizabeth and Andy for their help in editing and shaping 
concepts.  Further, I’d like to thank my committee members Dr’s Metcalfe, Flake, Garg, 
Araposthatis, and McGlone for all of their guidance and assistance in completing the 
research.   
I would like to express a personal thanks to Rob, Sam, and Tim for their 
encouragement, support and logistics.  Finally I would like to thank my parents, wife, son 
and dogs for their constant support and patience. 
  
 vi 
A Trust Based Methodology for Determining Identity Risk 
 
Brian Arnold Soeder, Ph.D 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor:  K. Suzanne Barber 
 
Identity theft, fraud, and abuse are rapidly increasing around the world, yet how 
information systems security providers verify user credentials remains generally 
unchanged[32]. In order to grant users access to services such as bank accounts or social 
networks, providers must collect information to store as user credentials. Previous 
research using authentication and authorization approaches has examined validating user 
credentials and controlling access, but these approaches still fall short in accurately 
identifying users[48]. To confirm user identity, most protocols only offer a binary 
indicator. Thus, quantifying the levels of trust between service providers and their users 
is necessary but not sufficient for ensuring secure transactions. In the context of 
transactions, this research proposes leveraging credential attributes to improve confidence 
in a user's identity leveraging trust and risk management methodologies. 
Transactions between users on the Internet require credentials that have a fixed 
number of attributes.  When these credentials are created, attributes such as Social 
Security number, mother’s maiden name, and address are used to validate a particular 
user.  Attributes are often lost, stolen or compromised. Once the attributes of an identity 
are compromised, anyone can assume that identity with benign or malicious purposes.  
Traditional solutions to this problem are to increase the trust level of the authentication 
through multiple modes, such as biometrics or smartcard tokens.  While biometrics and 
 vii 
smartcards are very useful attributes for increasing trust, this research shows that it is 
possible to increase trust of users with attributes typically held by or known to the user. 
This approach is appropriate in terms of cost and convenience and scales to a large 
number of transactions. Using only the attributes registered with an identity provider 
(e.g., address, zip code, name, etc.) can show how trusted a user is who presents an 
identity.  Further, the risk to a service provider of allowing access to that user can be 
established with this limited information. 
Specifically, this research approach correlates attributes with existing information, 
including patterns of using attributes to authenticate the user and trustworthiness of 
existing data maintained by identity providers. The ability to correlate and vary these 
attributes provides higher confidence in a presented credential. The proposed 
methodology is shown experimentally to more accurately assess the risks of granting 
users access to a given set of data and information then existing approaches. These 
approaches to identification are shown to significantly increase the confidence of 
credentials granted to individuals through a series of simulations representing common 
transactions involving identity. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Suppose that on Monday we cast a certain bar of metal into a statue. Then on Tuesday, 
we melt the statue down and recast the metal into a vase. And on Wednesday, we melt 
the vase and are left with just the piece of metal. Surely the statue was the piece of metal 
on Monday and the vase was the piece of metal on Tuesday. But the vase was not the 
statue and neither one of these was the piece of metal on Wednesday.   
 
Roderick Chisholm (1973) 
 
The above quote highlights the current state of online identities.  The statue and 
the vase are composed of the same material, yet the true identity of either object cannot 
be detected solely by looking at their compositions.  Similarly, vast amounts of online 
information compose human and system identities, and this information is stored in 
different locations all over the world. Yet, we cannot ascertain the true nature of an 
identity simply by examining the composition of this information.  Understanding how to 
untangle these complex sets of information is a challenging task, but it is possible to 
leverage existing online information about people and systems to gain confidence in their 
identities.  
Businesses see significant amounts of consumer identity fraud and have little 
ability to react to it.  Identity fraud and abuse is estimated to cost businesses billions 
annually [44].  Massive data and information breaches are now commonplace and 
compromise users’ identity attributes (e.g., passwords and Social Security numbers).  By 
compromising these critical pieces of data, thieves can also compromise other third-party 
systems where users’ credentials are stored [42, 43].  The financial burdens of 
compromised identities have grown so great that the U.S. government formed the 
National Strategy on Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC).  NSTIC was launched to 
raise identity trustworthiness in online transactions by enlisting a team of public and 
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private entities. In order to combat common points of failure identified by the NSTIC and 
others, this research proposes an approach that dynamically measures user reputation and 
experience to build greater confidence in user identity.  Specifically, using the context of 
online transactions is one way to examine the different types of trust required between 
people and systems during online identity creation and verification processes.  
Ultimately, the risks associated with trusting identities are also quantified.  This research 
delivers new methods and algorithms that provide: 
• Quantifiable measure of trust in an identity; 
• Increased precision of trust in an identity using less expensive information-
based authentication; 
• Predict the information on which to rely when authenticating an identity. 
• Assess risk for service providers before granting access to information 
1.1 IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS 
In order to more concretely define the scope of this research, the following 
conceptual definitions are used throughout the dissertation.  First, in accordance with the 
Personal Identity view [57], an identity (Ip) can be defined as an almost infinite list of 
attributes existing within a person 𝐼!!{A0,A1…Ai}.  These attributes consist of 
personally identifiable information (PII) about an individual such as name, address, and 
Social Security number. An identity can apply to any system, person, or thing composed 
of parts which are inherently inseparable from the whole.  An identity is also unique such 
that person or a system only can have one.  A user is defined as an individual using an 
identity. All online transactions begin with the enrollment process, where a user presents 
different attributes to create credentials such as email addresses and passwords with an 
identity provider or service provider.  It is important to note that individuals can use one 
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or more identity credentials simultaneously [1, 13, 57].   Therefore credential 𝑐 ⊆ 𝐼!, 
where 𝑐 = 𝐴!,𝐴!,⋯ ,𝐴!   ∀  𝐴! ∈ 𝐼!. 
Figure 1 represents an example identity as modeled in this research. The identity 
is composed of a credential and multiple attributes with specific relationships to both the 
credential and the identity.  The identity value I0 represents the index in a connected 
graph model to be discussed later.   
  
  Figure 1: Graphical Model of Identities, Credentials, and Attributes 
Each node in the graph can be related to a corresponding type in the Identity Ecosystem 
[18] that will be discussed in further chapters. 
In this research, the terms identity provider and service provider have distinct 
meanings but sound the same..   For example, a user could enroll with Facebook, which 
would be considered a service provider, by presenting different identity attributes.  
Facebook verifies the presented attributes and the user becomes an authorized user with 
credentials (e.g., user name and password).  The same user could also use their Facebook 
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credentials to log into another service, such as Twitter.  In this situation, Facebook would 
be an identity provider, and Twitter would be a service provider.   
This overlap also points to a common problem in identity security.  Identity 
verification processes vary greatly by identity provider and are not always transparently 
communicated between different providers.  This can create an environment of distrust, 
even though users generally present the same set of attributes when enrolling with 
different providers [22].  Credentials can be created from the same identity using 
different methods and combinations of attributes depending on the decisions made at 
enrollment time.  Different companies and agencies can also store, govern, and manage 
credentials using different rule sets.  For example, the magnitude of available user 
credentials with different providers in 2012 is illustrated in Table 1.  
 
Credential Category Number in 
2012 (millions) 
Smartcard 6925 
Social Media top 10 2380 
Email Sites top 10 2066 
Internet User Current Population 2267 
Credentials Per User At least 5.01 
Table 1: User Accounts on the Internet [46, 47, 51, 52] 
Table 1 establishes with some degree of certainty that any individual Internet user 
has, on average, at least five credentials.  By obtaining only a few of those attributes, a 
thief could compromise the information associated with more than five of a user’s 
credentials.  This overlap in attributes could also be causal to any number of identity-
based threats to the user.  If identity providers converge on a set of attributes that are slow 
to change, then the probability of compromise in those attributes grows, then the 
likelihood of identity theft could decrease [4].   
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Convergence is one of the driving factors of the Federal Identity Credential, and 
Access Management (FICAM) Implementation guidelines [30].  These guidelines discuss 
the close relationship between three important processes of identity creation: 
credentialing, authentication, and authorization. These processes verify whether or not an 
identity is trustworthy based on available attribute information and are used for access 
control decisions [4, 9, 13].  In other words, these processes demonstrate implicit trust 
between the users and identity providers, and usually result in a “yes” (e.g., this user or 
provider is who they are claiming to be) or “no” (e.g., this user or provider is not who 
they are claiming to be).   
The lack of variety of attributes used also adds to difficultly in trusting identity 
providers.  In this research, trust is a quantifiable factor that captures the degree of 
confidence maintained in a piece, or collection of data [15].  Trust is also directional 
between the service or identity provider and the user. This research focuses directionally 
on the trust of a user’s identity by an identity provider.  By simply ensuring a sound 
distribution of attributes and varying their usage, identity providers are more apt to be 
trustworthy.  Unfortunately, the lack of variety in attributes, slow rate of change, and 
large overlap of attributes between identity providers leads to higher threat vectors in 
identity compromise.   
Identity providers offer confidentiality, authentication and authorization services 
to a variety of users.  These providers can be compromised by other types of simple 
attribute theft from other Identity providers [49] and not even know it! Trusted 
repositories are being compromised by a variety of vectors such as DigiNotar, Gemnet, 
and others [34].  Operating system and browser providers also maintain lists of trusted 
identity providers based on less-than-explicit criteria [50].  In this type of marketplace, 
users have to either pay for a certain type of key (i.e., a key with an apriori level of trust 
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set by the application vendor), or use some other type model for credentialing.  This 
problem is magnified for the service providers who have to determine which types of 
credentials to accept.  There is still no formal, widely accepted mechanism for 
determining a quantitative value of trust placed in these repositories.  
 
1.1.1 Existing Authentication Solutions 
While there are significant challenges with authentication on the Internet, there 
are different categories in the solution space.  These categories will be discussed more in 
section 2.  One solution category is to add higher integrity to the enrollment process.   
This control strategy has lead to increased focus on authentication and authorization, the 
two main transaction protocols using identities.  A common method to control the 
creation of identities is to conduct high assurance enrollment [40, 49].  This type of 
enrollment provides for escalating degrees of verification to include physical identity 
verification as well as biometric processes.  Using a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), 
identity providers can issue credentials and maintain a degree of certainty that the trust 
inherent in the infrastructure will provide cryptographic certainty during authentication.  
The authentication protocols then support a check to the infrastructure to ensure that the 
PKI is valid.  Unfortunately, controlling enrollment usually creates more attributes and 
takes significantly more time.  Often times, it adds more of a burden to the end user.  
Another category for authentication is introducing multiple factors [37].  Asking 
users for something they know (e.g. their mother’s maiden name), something they have 
(e.g. drivers license) and something they are (e.g. finger print scan) strengthens the 
authentication protocol, especially if these concepts are used in combination with one 
another.  Similarly to the aforementioned distrust between identity providers based on 
enrollment processes, these stores of identities are disconnected and distrustful of each 
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other.  Some researchers have tried to connect credential trust to provider trust during the 
authentication process [9, 24].  This connection is useful to an authentication transaction 
it sets the theoretical foundation for the usage of a probabilistic authentication process.  
Finally the last category of solutions in authentication encryption is the most 
commonly used.  An Identity provider can cryptographically validate an identity [50].  
This method has two fundamental approaches.  The first is to simply encrypt traffic from 
one the sender to the receiver.  This encryption is limited to ensuring that no one can see 
the traffic as it transits the network.  Encryption helps with confidentiality of the 
attributes inside of credentials but falls short on ensuring that the end user is the one who 
actually owns the identity.  The other approach is the cryptographically sign an identity.  
This is similar to the Public Key approach discussed earlier [20].  It can ensure the sender 
of the credential has some ownership over his attributes.  Signing of credentials falls 
short of making authentication easier because it requires some kind of an out of band 
issuance of these cryptographic credentials.   
1.1.2 Existing Authorization Solutions 
Other researchers have focused on solving these fundamental trust problems with 
access control protocols.  A significant category for adding trust to transactions using 
access control protocols is based on role/attribute [10].  An identity store with some 
degree of trust can either supply information about the user through attributes directly or 
can do so in a federated manner.  This approach allows more granular access policies to 
be built and ultimately increases the level of effectiveness in identification due to the 
abstraction layer that attributes and roles provide.  The drawback to Attribute Based 
Access Control is the need to define a policy for each type of information that is used.  
An example would be a policy that apriori defines a user with a certain collection of 
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attributes will be allowed to access a piece of data.  It fails to allow for access to others 
who need the data but are not high risk.   
Another important factor of access control is that it provides an abstraction layer 
that a service provider can use to view users in the form of an identity rather then just a 
credential.  Access control techniques have been based on trust as well.  Liu [06] has 
taken the concept of trust derived during the authentication procedure and abstracted it 
for use during the access control transaction.  This formalism provides a way to view 
authentication and access control in the same model, which is useful.  When coupled with 
the more robust means to do access control, and the reuse of authentication transaction 
data, Snyder’s view of Protection in Access control is immensely useful [11].  He 
abstracts the users to types of access and shows relationships with the user and the 
service through a graph.  These graphs allow a query to answer specific questions about 
how to make dynamic access control decisions based on these relationships.  This 
category of approaches falls short due to the formalism needed to conduct a transaction.  
Each relationship must be predefined and connected with the types of data to be 
controlled.  This assumes that all data is known as well as all possible types of 
relationships.  A more practical approach is needed that is responsive to service provider 
needs.   
1.2 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Service providers must conduct a set of transactions to ask the authentication 
question, “who to the person/entity seeking the given service” and the authorization 
question, “is the person/entity eligible for the given service.”  Depending on the service, 
answering these questions may be very simple and occur simultaneously (e.g. access to a 
sales event site of your favorite retailer) or be very complex and separate (e.g. 
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authentication and authorization at immigration).  Well before the user transaction with 
the service provider occurs, the User U1 enrolls with the identity provider for I1 with a 
certain set of attributes.  U1 is granted a credential C1 with which he can access a certain 
set of services.  C1 is associated with one identity provider and using only a subset of its 
attributes such as a username and password, the User can then present C1 to service 
provider S1.  S1 then passes these attributes to I1 and if validated, the authentication 
transaction is complete.  In other words if validated, I1 asserts that the attributes from C1 
equal what is expected from U1.      
There are many situations in which this might not be the case.  In the next step of 
the transaction, S1 validates that C1 has access based the set of attributes deemed 
necessary for access to specific data or resources.  Again, the attributes from C1 represent 
a probability of 1 that it represents U1 although it is in an entirely different context from 
the Authentication transaction.  Finally, U2 can compromise the entire process by stealing 
the necessary attributes to represent itself as U1 by recreating C1.  Therefore it is clear that 
the probability of C1 representing U1 isn’t 1.  It must be lower based on several factors.  
This dissertation asks a series of questions that generates probabilities in each step 
of these transactions that represent the confidence that U1 is represented by C1.    
Specifically, the dissertation assesses probabilities for the following steps: 
1. Attribute Compromise Probability- As Attributes Ai are used it is important 
to evaluate their utility.  Attributes are more useful if there is a probability that 
they haven’t been compromised.  Without an understanding of compromise 
possibility, Identity Providers could and do use the same attributes expecting a 
lot more utility from them.   
2. Authenticity of a User U1- As User U1 conducts transactions, it is important 
that the attributes that he uses have values that are considered valid based off 
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of the identity repository.  Authenticity is useful as a probability because it 
provides the ability for a user to have some invalid attributes but still provide 
evidence to an authentication decision.  A user won’t always remember 
everything but the more they know, the more authentic they are.  
3. Reliability of a User U1- In addition to getting attributes correct, the 
repetition of correctness of a specific attribute adds to the level of trust of the 
identity.  Reliability is expressed as a probability that indicates the probability 
of the user providing consistently correct credentials.  The utility of this 
metric is primarily the ability to describe whether an identity thief is using a 
stolen identity.  If so the identity provider will have the ability to respond 
either by asking for more attributes or by some other means.   
Taken together these probabilities form an aggregate confidence metric expressed 
as risk.  Risk is the combination of each of these factors expressed as the probability that 
a user is who he says he is.  Risk is useful as a single metric for all identity and service 
providers to reason about whether to authenticate or authorize a user.   
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Overall, this dissertation proposes the following hypothesis:  
Using a confidence metric for transaction-based identity processes increases the 
accuracy of identification. 
A confidence metric in an identity can be established by decoupling identities 
from credentials.  After they are decoupled, a calculation of trust involving authenticity, 
reliability, and risk can be performed in order to represent an aggregate view of 
confidence in identity.  Accuracy of identification in transactional systems is based on 
identity (i.e., thing or person) presenting an artifact represented as credential.  Once the 
 11 
credential is validated, the user can perform any action that is allowed from that 
credential.  In practical usage of identity, transactions that use identities are typically very 
tightly coupled between authentication mechanisms and authorization mechanisms.  For 
example, there is a one-to-one relationship between authentication of a user and 
authorization of that same user to most email systems used on the Internet.  In order to 
peel apart the layers of identity usage, certain questions can help frame the problems this 
dissertation addresses.  One important question that must be asked about an identity in a 
transaction is: 
What evidence is there that the person or system that is using a credential is who they say 
they are?  
There are many facets of this question.  A user could be using a credential 
fraudulently.  Users often share account passwords with other users; in this situation, a 
different user is clearly using a credential.  Although the action is usually performed with 
benign intentions, the possibility illustrates a shortfall of current mechanisms.  If one user 
enables another user to impersonate them, the impersonation is likely possible when 
using any credential short of strong biometric identification [29].  More often though, a 
credential is compromised by missing pieces of information that harm the identity, such 
as attributes that have changed over time, changes of users, and inherent issues with the 
protocols governing these attributes.  Calculating the believability in an identity helps to 
overcome the changes that have happened post-enrollment and throughout the identity 
transactional lifecycle.  Another important question to ask about an identity during a 
transaction is: 
Is the user actually using credentials for malicious purposes during the transaction? 
Assume an identity provider issues a credential to a user under the belief this 
identity is a benign actor with a legitimate purpose.  Information can be derived about a 
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user’s identity based on the actions it takes while using the credential. Using simple 
attributes of a credential during a transaction, it is possible to develop an identity 
reputation.  For example, if a credential is used to access data that deviates from its 
reputation in a transaction, that credential and/or identity could be flagged. This 
confidence metric can represent the missing information to support an access control 
decision.  The final question to ask about an identity during a transaction is: 
Is the identity presenting a risk to information in the transaction? 
This question is distinct from that of malicious purpose; an identity could also 
present direct risks to data in the transaction.  A user’s poor reputation, combined with 
the importance of the data access, can provide a third component to identity confidence.   
Furthermore, the aforementioned hypothesis will be examined using three specific 
research questions about identification processes and identity confidence. 
1.4.1   Research Question 1 
RQ1:  Which attributes of identity are most trusted? 
Trust in identity attributes is a critical underpinning to any use of that Identity.  
Since an Identity is composed of these attributes, one must be able to reason about which 
ones are used, and compromised to have any sort of ability to define higher level trust or 
risk metrics.  Today these attributes go through empirical evaluation methods to 
determine the most compromised [48].  In order to increase trust levels in a user, it is 
helpful to use the least compromised attributes to identify that user.   
In order to answer this question, this research proposes first building a model to 
view the relationships between attributes and credentials.  Credential repositories are 
initialized when users enroll with a certain set of attributes.  Each provider is limited by 
its enrollment process and contained attributes.  Attribute types can vary, but some are 
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more often used than others across identity providers.  The connections of attributes form 
the basis for demonstrating the most compromised attributes [68].  A review of these 
attributes in use by identity providers will be conducted to bootstrap the initial data for a 
graph of attributes. After building the initial model of attributes to represent an identity, 
the connectedness of these attributes will be assessed following a social graph approach 
[85].  Centrality of nodes is then calculated using Eigenvector Centrality.  The most 
central nodes in the graph become the most likely to be compromised.  Probability of Fill 
is also introduced as a way to reason about how frequently attributes are used across 
credential repositories.   
1.4.2 Research Question 2 
RQ2: Can the reliability and authenticity of an identity in a transaction help demonstrate 
trust to identity? 
 An identity’s reliability and authenticity in transactions are necessary to compute 
trust in that identity.  Without establishing the user of the identity is using the correct 
attributes (authenticity) and that they are being used repeatedly (reliability), trust cannot 
be accomplished.   
Building on the reference model of attribute characteristics established through 
RQ1, RQ2 aims to capture what available information at the start of a transaction.  The 
answers to RQ1 help us understand which attributes of a credential are important for 
calculating confidence.  The attributes collected in the transaction are compared to the 
golden records for identities, and the comparison yields a factor representing the 
trustworthiness of a credential’s source based on the types of attributes that it uses.  Other 
comparisons can be made between the values of each attribute.  For example, if the 
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values of attributes in one credential supporting an identity do not match the values in 
another related credential, overall trust is diminished.  
1.4.3 Research Question 3 
RQ3: Is the risk posed by an identity a reliable predictor of the validity of the identity? 
Asking the question about the risk posed by an identity helps a service provider 
decide whether to grant access or not.  Returning this risk as a probability that a user is 
valid, has powerful implications.  The simple yes or no approach to authorization can be 
replaced with a much more robust approach that incorporates information about the user 
and how they have behaved over time.   
In RQ1 and RQ2, differing components can be calculated by relating their values. 
RQ3 compares multiple methods of combining trust and attribute compromise modalities.  
The first method is based on a weighted sum approach [27] and is called Improved 
Reliability.  This approach allows the reliability metric to be directly related to the other 
the compromise probability of an attribute.  Another method involves a future risk 
calculation using a Bayesian network approach [38, 39, 75].  This approach allows the 
risk calculation to make inferences about the potential future state of the Identity I0 at a 
future time t1+x.   
Future state inferences are used to reduce computational complexity and 
normalize error at future states of the system.  Results will be evaluated to determine if 
confidence in identity is added.  The algorithm will reuse guidelines that consider the 
impact severity of disclosing information [19, 22].  When combined with calculated 
probabilistic risk, this approach provides a more traditional view of risk based on severity 
and probability of occurrence.  The new risk model will be compared to more general 
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risk-based models [2, 19, 22].  Results will be evaluated for differences in risk levels 
between correctly used identities and incorrectly used (or downright false) identities.   
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Chapter 2: Related Work 
2.1 IDENTIFICATION METHODOLOGIES 
Existing research dealing with identifying a person or entity often involves third 
parties. With instances of identity fraud growing over 5 percent from 2011 to 2012, many 
users are concerned about the safety of their personally identifiable information [32].   
One source of concern is supposedly trusted, yet oftentimes weak, third party identity 
providers.  High profile attacks on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificate authorities 
such as DigiNotar underscore this point.  When PKI’s are breached, many dire and fraud-
related consequences to the end user can occur [32].  The very fact that these certificate 
authorities make credentials available over a network makes them attractive targets for 
attack [25].  Such ID repositories can have perfectly adequate methods for proofing, 
validation, management, dissemination, and storage, but still be hampered by basic side 
channel attacks based on infrastructure protection [25].    
None of these systems have proven certain parties can be trusted to manage 
authentication or access control [5].  This flaw becomes a critical assumption of most 
researchers dealing with large client server networks.  Many protocols including PGP and 
PKI have relied on trusted third parties to authenticate.  In the web-based world, 
confidence in identity is a larger problem not typically dealt with, but authentication with 
a known repository is common.  In even the most rigid of authentication schemes, certain 
bad actor vectors can defeat the practical application of authentication.  Passwords can be 
stolen, biometric data can be compromised, and replay attacks can happen over insecure 
channels.   
Thus, this research assumes that looking at authentication with a statistical 
approach is more useful.  Authors writing authentication protocols make many 
 17 
assumptions, and if one assumption is invalidated, then the entire protocol is at risk.  The 
first potential flaw is that most authentication protocols make some assumption about the 
persistence of an authenticated user [7, 8].  In the transactional space of the web, 
regardless of the type of application layer configuration, each transaction is characterized 
by the atomicity of its operations, largely due to HTML and the static nature of the World 
Wide Web [9].   
Another important assumption analyzed in this dissertation is that a trusted third 
party is becoming less viable.  When assuming that a third party manages authentication, 
most previous research fails to account for the attributes of the third party, which could 
decrease trust in that third party.  Trusted third parties must be reachable over networks 
they do not control.  Since they can’t control the path, these parties can’t fully guarantee 
privacy.  They also employee workers who have the passwords and keys to trusted 
infrastructure, which could potentially compromise transactions for varying purposes.  
Third parties can also have enemies that employ out-of-band and other techniques to 
compromise transactions for varying purposes.  Based on these factors, this research 
questions the assumption that trusted third parties can even exist.   
The final assumption this research makes that differs from common authentication 
models is that relationships between consumers and providers are dynamic.  Most 
authentication protocols involve the pairwise concept of consumer and provider.  A 
statistical approach demonstrates that a node acting as a consumer could be a republisher, 
and thus might potentially warrant less trust.  For example, in current U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) networks, many intermediary sites download and republish data.  These 
sites often masquerade digitally as end users by hardcoding in user names and passwords.  
Some sites also open up unnecessary back doors for reasons that aren’t always fully 
understood by content owners until it is too late.  A statistically based authentication 
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mechanism allows statistical inferences about where data goes that might help data 
owners to better understand and meet emerging requirements.   
Beyond simple authentication lies the problem of trusting users with access to 
certain types of content.  This problem is usually passed on to the authorization or access 
control mechanism to deal with.  The fundamental assumption made by that component is 
that authentication has already taken place, whether through a trusted third party, local 
source, or other means.  Most authorization mechanisms, such as Role Based Access 
Control (RBAC) have the ability to perform type authentication and determine 
permissions [10].  Authorization mechanisms also have detailed understandings of the 
nature of protected content.  In some cases, the content could be reflected by a database 
in which each table, record, or column tagged with certain access permissions.  In other 
cases, access control could be granted based upon combinations of attributes within a 
Web service.  These cases simply depend on the protocol being used and the access 
mechanism chosen.  
Given the atomic nature of transactions and authentication, combined with an 
assumed authorization, the risk of each transaction can grow.  In order to quantify this 
risk to a system, we must relate the state of an authentication with the corresponding data 
a particular transaction is attempting to access.  This relationship will help build more 
robust models and possibly even allow for direct feedback to the authentication system.  
At a minimum, the model should account for standard characteristics of the user to use 
for correlation.   
Overall, identification of a person or entity is a problem that can be approached 
from a psychological, biological, or network-based perspective.  Each view has the 
ability to contribute toward a common goal of identifying people or systems for specific 
transactions.  The psychological or humanistic view of identity focuses on the qualitative 
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attributes of a person [26].  From this view, many factors can affect identity, including 
age, self-perception, role, and mental view [18].  Each one of these attributes can be 
viewed as properties of an individual’s persona or credential, as we will later discuss.  
Typically, an online identity is associated with a persona, thus allowing an individual 
with a singular identity to have multiple personas.  One way to model this view comes 
from Kini and Chooineh, who describe the relationship between humans and electronic 
commerce [24].  The derivation of a persona from a human identity involves an 
interpersonal view, a societal view, and a relational view.  Other research in biometrics 
and health sciences incorporates a different perspective on identity.  
Biometrics is the art and science of identity verification based on human 
characteristics [28].  Biometric identity verification results in accepting or rejecting the 
identity claim made by a given person based on biological attributes such as fingerprints 
and DNA [29].  The long-established goal of biometrics is making identification a fully–
automatic process.  Most biometric algorithms focus on a single modality to establish 
identity, and the most relevant aspects of automated identity verification to this research 
are multiple modality biometric systems.  These systems demonstrate significant 
confidence improvement by fusing single modes using approaches such as summing [28, 
29]. Along with confidence improvement, some challenges emerge when performing 
information fusion, including the required performance overhead [31]. False positives 
and false negatives are also important biometric approaches.  These are measured based 
on the characteristics of the equipment used for each mode of identification.  Most single 
modal algorithms assume each mode follows a Gaussian distribution [29].  This 
assumption leads to the same number of false positives and thus, a very linear 
distribution.   
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Multimodal approaches to identification can help to decrease the instances of 
false positives and negatives by providing a more robust data set [29].  These approaches 
can be combined by different weighting factors, which form different types of 
distributions.  These usually form a non-parametric distribution, which keeps the 
evaluation from focusing on the dimensionality of the result.  Using multiple modes of 
understanding also provides for greater fidelity and reliability overall [31].   
All of these existing approaches to identification have their shortfalls.  Some rely 
on finding a large amount of additional information attributes about a person to increase 
the strength of identification.  Some can only identify parts of an identity that are not 
sufficient to ensure a consistent usage pattern.  All of these methodologies fall short due 
to a need to produce a singular result in order to take an action on.  This result must either 
be to accept or reject the identity.  The utility of a probabilistic approach is the flexibility 
of use in determining whom to trust.  It is possible to set a threshold based on the need for 
integrity and strength of identification. 
2.2 TRUST METHODOLOGIES 
Trust can be modeled from social, economic, computational, and cognitive 
perspectives [60].  Since trust characteristics are highly dependent on the system they are 
measured in, and identity is very uncertain in e-service systems, trust will be used in this 
research as a tool for increasing confidence in identity.  The factors below contribute to 
formalization of trust in this dissertation: 
• Trust is has a value between 0 and 1 
• Trust is directional 
• Trust is time dependent 
• Multiple classes of trust factors are interdependent 
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With these factors, trust becomes a superset of the measures used to calculate a better 
confidence in the identity of a user.  More specifically, this dissertation applies previous 
research on belief and reputation toward combining multiple modalities to form a better 
confidence metric [1, 3, 4, 60].  
2.2.1 Belief 
The initial condition of a connection to a service provider requires a set of beliefs 
about the user that initiated the connection.  In most authentication protocols, that belief 
is based solely on the credential presented and the implied reputation of its source.  Any 
sort of connection from a user involves implicit vulnerability [1].  Thus, it is important to 
build a better model of the user or identity that is attempting to connect.  Gefen posits that 
any consumer belief is based on a three dimensional scale of trustworthiness including 
ability, integrity, and benevolence of the vendor [1].  These measures reflect the view of 
the user to the online service provider.  Metrics from these dimensions can be used to 
establish confidence in the identity provider based on the credential presented.   
Maurer presents another perspective of the belief of credentials that is based on a 
confidence parameter in the statement presented to an agent [20].  In this view, each 
statement earns specific confidence values based on the calculated probability in the truth 
of the statement.  For example, a statement is a certificate credential, and the agent 
calculates trustworthiness based on a certification chain of the credential within a PKI 
[20].  Like Maurer, this research assumes that a third party identity provider cannot be 
fully trusted, but does have explicit trustworthiness based on certain factors.  In the 
credential digraph from Maurer’s example, each link in would make a belief statement 
about the previous node based on its authenticity as determined by different factors.  In 
Maurer’s model, these factors depend solely on the links between the different 
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certification nodes in a PKI when viewed as a graph.  This reduces the belief question of 
a credential down to a calculation of probabilities based on vertices and edges in a graph.   
While useful for helping to establish initial confidence in an identity, Maurer’s 
view lacks some utility because of the computational infeasibility of implementing a 
calculation, given that thousands of possible root nodes in certification paths on the 
Internet exist [47,49, 50].  Each of these PKI’s has a different credential enrollment 
process and different attributes [62].  Thus, a more simplified view can be used to help a 
service provider calculate its initial belief in the credential presented.   
Similarly, Reiter and Stubblebine recognize that neither the computation of paths 
[2] nor peer trust [62] is sufficient for establishing an initial estimate of confidence in a 
credential [9]. The researchers conclude that inferring binding of a certificate or 
credential to a specific entity causes any model to lack explicitness, and a model’s 
meaning should be ambiguous [9].  Following Reiter’s lead, this research formalizes an 
identity belief model by adding factors that make binding explicit, such as enrollment and 
transmission approach to credential.   
Furthermore, the user’s opinion of the identity provider is another important 
principle to consider when describing the belief of an identity and that is the user’s 
opinion [9, 62].  In most research, the user’s opinion is a value set by an agent or specific 
user based on their subjective view of the credential or identity provider.  This research 
sets that opinion as a preset value from the service provider to describe the veracity of the 
identity provider.  Further, Reiter and Stubblebine combine these factors to establish 
meaningful principles, including simplicity, effectiveness, meaningfulness, and 
computational feasibility [9].  Evaluation of the belief model presented in this dissertation 
will draw from these principles and evaluation criteria.   
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Another criterion often taken into account in belief of an identity is the ability to 
verify the user’s credentials [13, 23, 35].  The model in this research focuses less on 
belief than the other factors previously established for computing the metric.  This 
research makes the critical assumption that the identity provider has already verified 
credentials prior to the computation of belief.  The next factor often considered in belief 
models is locality of opinion.  Although previous research examines this factor from a 
more general perspective, [1, 3, 4, 9] Blaze, et al. [23] focus on the need for making a 
local decision about belief.  There are many reasons for this focus, including flexibility of 
behavior, computational feasibility, and independence.  The characteristic of locality in 
this belief generation approach will allow service providers to maintain independence 
from external sources, which will be useful in cases where the belief is calculated without 
external connection.  This will also allow quicker computation of the initial belief metric 
since service providers won’t be expected to follow a PKI chain for verifiability.  
In addition, Barber and Kim provide a model for establishing a foundational 
belief in identity [14].  Their agent-based approach has one agent calculating trust in 
other agents, and representing that calculation as truth and belief.  The model components 
include a view of the agent making the calculation, or a perspective modeler.  This 
modeler represents initial truth or belief about another agent by maintaining a knowledge 
base, acquiring knowledge about other agents, updating these models, making inferences 
about the updates, and revising again.  The differences between Barber and Kim’s 
approach and that of this research are focused in two areas: data type gathered to form the 
knowledge base and frequency of update.  Barber and Kim’s agent gathers the knowledge 
for the model based only on relations of other agents, while this research will use data to 
make inferences about the utility of the data to form a belief model.  In terms of the 
frequency of update, Barber and Kim’s agent updates constantly, as required by other 
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agents to keep their knowledge current.  The belief store in this research will update at 
t=0 of a transaction as presented with credentials.  This approach is meant to take into 
account the nature of a user’s identity as described in broad terms and not react to the 
dynamics of transactions.   
In order to represent initially and update the knowledge base, this research relies 
heavily on transactional context.  Many Search Engine Optimization and Analytics 
providers on the Internet have begun collecting this data and storing it for different 
purposes [66, 67].  This data can also be applied to the present research, as illustrated by 
a table of commonly used data collected during general web based transactions by 







Number of Visits 
Time Zone 
Custom Variables-
added by user 
Table 2: Google Analytics Transactional Context 
Krishnamurthy and other researchers argue that these parts of the transactional context 
containing personally identifiable information makes them potentially harmful to Internet 
users [68].  However, this dissertation argues that from a service provider’s perspective, 
this PII can also be used in the computation of confidence in a user’s identity.  
 Trustworthiness using belief-based approaches correlates multiple perspectives to 
provide a view into the authenticity of a user. In short, calculating the authenticity of the 
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user can satisfy the quality of belief in architecture with only a singular perspective.   
Authenticity can leverage the aforementioned transactional context and determine its 
validity by checking it against the identity provider’s golden records for the identity.   
2.2.2 Reputation  
One of the areas in which reputation has been frequently studied is in agent-based 
systems.  Reputation-based trust modeling is used typically when the trusting agent or 
algorithm has no experience with the identity it seeks to trust [2].  It is also useful when 
the agent or user being trusted changes frequently as is the case in systems such the focus 
is on high atomicity in packet based transactions.  Reputation calculation often times 
includes a method for sharing reputation of users [3].  Another concern in reputation 
based trust mechanisms is the accuracy of the algorithm.  This is dealt with by 
authentication methods through formal paths and algorithms by digital signatures and 
chains of trust.  The challenge with this approach is that it predicates the reputation of the 
entire system on the validity of the third party trusted Identity provider.  If this changes as 
the literature on reputation-based trust suggests that it can [9], then it invalidates the 
entire chain of trust.  As discussed above, an agent based or decentralized approach such 
as in PGP is one possible solution [5].  This research illustrates another possibility to 
make the reputation of third party identity providers more explicit. 
Metrics used to characterize focus on satisfaction of agents, or networks.  
Behavior-based trust methodologies have also applied Fuzzy Logic [2], which allows the 
node building trust to establish membership functions that establish a trust model 
gradually without the need for instant input.  Adaptive Trust Negotiation (ATN) is a 
technique that can allow behavior-based strategies for trust to filter misinformation while 
querying for new information, as necessary [3, 41].  ATN is extremely useful in this 
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space due to its ability to help shape and better understand behavior patterns of actors 
using identities and credentials.   
Finally there has been work on defining a category of trust that applies to future 
interactions using Bayesian Trust Methodologies [37]. Each node will build a graph 
model of trust of its peer nodes in a directed graph that allows it to conduct analysis to 
determine which nodes are trustworthy.   This is useful in determining context of identity 
users in order to better establish their behavior in large-scale deployments.    
Trustworthiness using reputation-based approaches tends to focus on single 
agents or peers trusting each other by performing consistent actions.  It is easier to 
generate a reputation for a single identity in an architecture where a service provider is 
trusting an identity.  Calculating the reputation of the user can satisfy the quality of 
reputation in architecture with only a singular perspective by looking at the repeated 
actions that the identity takes.  The reliability measurement can leverage the 
aforementioned transactional context and determine its validity by checking it against the 
identity provider’s golden records for the identity.  Further the reliability measurement 
ensures that the same attributes are used correctly over several transactions.  If they aren’t 
used consistently and correctly, the reliability metric will be able to detect invalid use.   
2.2.3 Combining Modalities  
Generally, research shows that combining multiple modalities when making a 
confidence decision or recommendation is helpful in many domains [3, 13, 26].  In fact, 
many believe combining modalities is necessary to gain a sufficient picture of the trust 
associated with any one node or identity.  In the combinatorial approach of expert fusion 
advanced by Verlinde et al., provision is made for static factors [27].  In the case of 
identity, some known information about the backgrounds of users, static trust 
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information, or even risk data input into the algorithm to provide better fidelity of 
information.  Verlinde makes the case that expert opinion is a necessary component for 
any fusion of data for analysis [27].  Others assert that static input must be considered in 
any automated fusion system [28, 29].  As in other dynamic systems, the types of trust 
being fused in a multimodal approach cannot account for structural changes in larger 
system [2].  
2.3 SYSTEMS IN MANUFACTURING ENVIRONMENTS 
While the present research is conducted in a transactional context, examining 
previous studies conducted in manufacturing environments are important for studying 
identity; these systems functionally represent identities in a fully automated environment 
instead of users or people.  In manufacturing environments, most of the systems 
employed are categorized as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems 
(SCADA).  These systems have classes composed of systems by function in a 
server/master and client/sensor/actuator model [78]. Security has often taken a backseat 
to communication design for performance [76].  But recently, as the Internet has become 
ubiquitous in manufacturing environments, and deregulation has hit manufacturing 
industries, security is much more of a concern [76].  Most security issues are driven by 
the lack of ability to identify systems internal to the network and subsequently authorize 
them to perform necessary functions [77].  In a closed environment, the identification of 
systems is relatively easy and can be done through preprogrammed codes and credentials 
such as certificates [78].  Unfortunately, this strategy is insufficient given the large 
number of insider threats and rising value of infrastructure run by SCADA systems.    
Historically, these insider threats have a few main categories.  The first category 
is changing data values.  One of the most important functions performed by SCADA 
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system is sending or receiving data [76].  For performance reasons, these interactions are 
almost never protected by traditional means of communicating securely over an untrusted 
network.  Manipulating data values can be disastrous in a manufacturing environment, 
causing faulty readings in the control center and potentially causing system operators to 
incorrectly perform functions.   
Another type of threat is to change control signals from the master or control 
areas to sensors, actuators or other types of systems that perform a necessary action.   
This threat is particularly vexing as demonstrated in the payload of worm Stuxnet which 
targeted specific models of systems control signals [80].  Stuxnet was able to modify 
these control signals on the wire by impersonating an authorized system leading to 
Siemens control systems in a manufacturing environment operating out of tolerance.  The 
next type of threat is focused on fraud by manipulating readings in a manufacturing 
network for a fraudulent purpose [76].  These insider fraud attacks could focus on either 
stealing information or detecting patterns that could be used to drive the manufacturer to 
perform an action.  
Attempts to secure these systems have focused in two main areas: the perimeter, 
and centrally in the environment [76].  Perimeter security is focused on detection of 
external breaches into the inside system.  Perimeter security is solely focused on 
detecting intrusions from external sources and can effectively detect attacks that are 
ongoing if patterns can be recognized [80].  However, this security approach is 
ineffective for the insider threats previously discussed since they all occur inside the 
perimeter.  Central detection is performed by consistency checks of the internal network 
of systems.  These consistency checks will look into the data being sent between systems 
to ensure that it falls within the modeled expected ranges.  Central detection requires that 
the model of the system be correct and also relies on communication paths to the central 
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detector being trusted.  In most cases within manufacturing and SCADA environments 
communication paths can’t fully be trusted due to the promulgation of IP networks and 
multiple entrance points to the Internet.   
Others have attempted to solve the challenge of securing paths and identification 
of devices through standard authentication, authorization and cryptographic techniques 
available on the Internet today [79, 80].  These approaches have some innate limitations 
due to the manufacturing domain [78].  One domain specific feature is power.  Often 
sensors and other systems operate only on battery and tokens or other credentials drive up 
power requirements due to frequency of use or other physical characteristics.  Another is 
that for systems to use a password or other credential it must be manually installed due to 
lack of user operation.  This causes the credential to not change for long periods of time.  
It also precludes the ability to perform password reset, revocation of credential or other 
techniques that are used to assist in information security.  In order to overcome this 
limitation, some research suggests that adding a third party to trust credentials can help 
[78, 79].   
It is also worth mentioning that another threat vector is a multiple system 
impersonator performing so called Sybil attacks [79].  These attacks focus on a system 
Identity impersonator attempting to authenticate with multiple identities until it finds one 
that works.  Sybil attack detection has been proven possible with enough knowledge and 
a lot of resources available [80, 81].  Further, Douceur postulates that Sybil attacks are 
never fully preventable without a trusted third party [81].  The question remains, if it is 
impossible to trust a third party to verify credentials then is a Sybil attack always 
possible?  What are the ways to reduce its possibility of occurrence? 
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2.4 VALUE OF IDENTITY ATTRIBUTES 
An online identity has value to the person using it, the identity provider, and the 
service providers that use it for transactions.  Therefore, the attributes that make up the 
identity must also have value.  First, there is value to the individual for a variety of 
different reasons.  These tend to be related specifically to the attributes themselves.  For 
example, users have a preference for using the same user account across multiple identity 
providers [86].  The value is derived from convenience as well as personal notions of 
consistency across communities of interest.  Mueller also discusses the costs in time and 
memory burden of maintaining multiple passwords [86].  Finally, there are switching 
costs for user account names that involve telling others new information about yourself.  
Mueller further discusses similar preferences that users have for other attributes by 
performing a conjoint study on cognitive preferences for different types of identity 
providers [86].  The result of this study was clear that certain groups of people placed 
statistically significant values on their attributes.  These can be measured based on group 
type and demographic.   
Identity providers also place value on the user identities.  There is a robust market 
for buying and selling identities [48] with some business earning several dollars for 
personal attributes.  Often these sales are harmless rather then contributing to the overall 
rate of identity theft.  Identity providers also realize this and have chosen to select 
common sets of attributes as documented in the 2014 NASPO report [88].  This report 
indicates that identity providers tend to choose standard Name, Location, Time and 
Identifying attributes to provide a very high identity-resolution rate.  Identity resolution is 
important when enrolling users as it verifies that the person establishing the account is 
who he says he his.  Yet, this can become a double-edged sword though during 
verification.  If an attribute is compromised and the same attribute is shared across many 
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providers, that attribute compromise can have a high impact.  The impact will be felt 
among all service providers who use that particular identity.  According to the Verizon 
annual identity report, compromise of identities and their associated attributes costs 
service providers over 400M [48].  According to Horton, humans strongly correlate 
compromise with utility.  The more compromised an attribute is the less useful it is [89].   
Thus it is critical to study the probability of compromise of identity attributes in 
order to reason about the rest of the components of Identity.  If identities are composed of 
attributes any abstraction of these attributes will provide at best incomplete information 
about that Identity.  At worst it will provide false conclusions about the validity of the 
identity or the process used to obtain the result. 
2.5 RISK MODELING METHODOLOGIES 
The use of a methodology to dynamically calculate a risk model based on (at a 
minimum) the above events would support identity verification and authentication 
services for calculating confidence.  The most recent Identity Fraud report indicates that 
risk isn’t used enough in calculation for securing data [32].  Manchala established that 
much of the information that goes into calculation of trust in entities could also be used to 
help inform risk models for access to that data [2].  In its most basic form risk is 
characterized as the probability of an occurrence of something along with its 
corresponding consequences if it happens [19].  In order to apply risk to the problem of 
identification, it is necessary to find a generalized approach to characterizing its current 
and future states.  Much of the data that could be collected during an identity transaction 
could help feed a probability calculation for specific acts.  CORAS has demonstrated the 
ability in specific instances of a model to return risk results for its underlying data [36].  
 32 
This approach is difficult and very web service specific, as it requires a detailed model 
including attributes and types of information stored to return information risk.   
A more generalized risk in data access described by Kearny, et al. suggests it is 
important to consider information holistically, and that usage of external risk information 
should be compared to a generalized case of compromise [19].  To gain a clearer picture 
of the future state, this research focuses more on a Bayesian approach as suggested by 
Bonafede, et al. [38].  They suggest using an enterprise wide approach toward assessing a 
future state of risk.  If rebuilt using a belief estimate and reputation as inputs, this model 
will apply to the enterprise of data secured by identity-based authentication and 
authorization mechanisms.   
Existing risk modeling methodologies fall short on their ability to model risk 
without understanding the consequence of the event.  In the case of Identity, 
consequences are almost innumerable.  Thus it is important to be able to quantify 
probabilistically a risk that an identity isn’t valid.  The validity of an identity is sufficient 
information for a service provider with which to make a decision.  
 
 33 
Chapter 3: Identity Attribute Usage 
RQ1:  Which attributes of Identity are most trusted? 
 
In order to calculate trust in an identity, the attributes that compose it must be 
considered.  It is possible to model these attributes in such a way that allows a provider to 
reason about which attributes to use and how to weigh them in any sort of usage.  The 
weighting approach will occur in the model presented in this research to enhance attribute 
utility by minimizing Probability of Attribute Compromise (PC) and maximizing the use 
of populated, known attributes.   By considering PC as a separate metric, it is possible for 
Identity Providers to make dynamic use of PC to conduct calculation of confidence in 
Identities that are attempting to gain access to resources.  In effect, the compromise 
probability also allows the Identity Providers to prefer attributes.  An attribute that had a 
low PC value would be preferred over one with a high PC value.  This preference allows 
the identity provider to buffer itself against possible attacks that could happen based on 
attributes that are compromised for the same identity in another provider.   
When a person enrolls with multiple identity providers on the Internet, each 
provider may ask for a different set of information or attributes upon enrollment.  These 
attribute types are often duplicated across sites and repositories.  These attributes form 
the basis for identification of a user to service providers.  If those attributes have similar 
values, then a compromise in one identity provider can lead to a compromise in another.  
Thus, this chapter presents a new model for determining attribute preference based on 
attribute usage and the inherent connections (dependencies) between attributes.  The 
model is empirically evaluated with two data sets – the Identity Ecosystem and the US 
Army central identity repository.  
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Identity providers use a variety of methods to combat is problem of attribute 
compromise.  One method is verifying sets of attributes to ensure the user who enrolls is 
actually who he or she claims to be [88].  This method has the advantage of providing a 
strong confidence on initial enrollment and a basis for future comparison.  However, once 
these attributes change, they can become less useful in for verifying an identity.  Another 
method conducting attribute validation at the time of use, often called online verification.  
For example, Google’s runtime position verification for transactions [90].  Unfortunately, 
this method is a narrow implementation of attribute verification; it only works for 
specific attributes, such as location.  In order to be more useful, this method must be 
more broadly applicable across attributes.  
Understanding which attributes are most likely to be compromised and 
establishing approaches to mitigate theses compromise is necessary.  For a single user 
with multiple attributes related to each other such that I={A1,A2, …An}, each identity 
implicitly has the full set of attributes.  For example, a user can have a Social Security 
Number and driver’s license.  Some attributes are more likely to change than others, such 
as address.  When enrolled, these attributes become instantiated into a credential 
provider.  The resulting set is most likely a subset of the overall attribute set for an 
identity.  As a person registers for multiple credentials with multiple providers with 
different needs, these sets can become disjointed.   
For example, provider N chooses the set of attributes of type {A0,A5,A8} to 
represent the person with identity I0 whereas provider M chooses the set of attributes of 
type {A0,A6,A9} to represent the same I0.  The attribute of type A0 is the only attribute 
common to both of these sets.  Therefore, the security functions being performed by 
provider M using A0 are potentially disrupted if A0 is compromised in provider N. This 
disruption results in the degradation of assurance associated with A0. Furthermore, A0 is 
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connected to the rest of the other attribute types.  Due to the connections between 
attributes and the dependency of credentials on respective attributes, it is possible to 
obtain other attribute types from A0.  For example, if A0 were a Social Security Number, 
then it would be possible to obtain user credentials (full name, citizenship status, etc.) 
from the compromise of that single attribute.  In practical terms, this puts all user 
transactions at risk.   
3.1 IDENTITY ATTRIBUTE MODEL  
In order to calculate popularity among attributes, this research models the 
linkages between them.  This will allow reasoning about which attributes are the most 
likely to be used in an attack.  The reference model will follow the same pattern as the 
Identity Ecosystem, which shows measurable relations between these attributes [18].  The 
model will reflect an overall identity view of a person and is applicable to different types 
of identities.  Furthermore, the model can be tailored to individual identity providers 
based on their specific attribute types and connections.   
In order to reason about the connectedness of these attributes, Identities can 
modeled in a graph reflecting attackers patterns as they compromise attributes (i.e. which 
attributes are used to gain access to other attributes).  The graph defining an Identity is 
represented as a social graph [100]. In this dissertation, the nodes are represented as 
identity attributes and the directional relationships between nodes reflect that one 
attribute can be discovered given the other. Thus, the relationships describe that an 
attacker can compromise can one attribute given a certain known attribute.  For example, 
if the attacker knows a person’s name, there is a probability the attacker can discover the 
person’s address. The relationships in the graph are weighted by these probabilities of 
discovery/compromise.   Let the nodes of the graph represent attribute I[An].  It is 
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asserted that the node’s value is independent of other nodes around it and it can take on 
values independently. This makes sense in the context of a person’s identity because an 
attribute must be fully independent of another (as defined in Chapter One). A person’s 
name value is independent of their address. Let the relationships of those identity 
attributes be represented by edges. Each edge in the graph represents a probability that 
one node will be compromised given the other node.  The corresponding weight of the 
edge type can be strong or weak.  For example, it is possible to obtain a person’s full 
name from a Social Security Card; therefore, the likelihood of obtaining one from the 
other is high.  The Center for Identity Ecosystem [18] characterizes different types of 
relationships as shown in Table 3.  In some cases, attributes have no relation; therefore, 
attributes in this model are shown as unconnected. This research will leverage the 
“Probabilistically_Determined_By” weighted relationship meaning one attribute, A1, 
points to another attribute, A2, with weighted probability, say .6, if attribute A2 can be 











Table 3: Properties of Attribute Relationships 
Figure 2 (a sample identity relationship graph) provides a better view of the relationships 
between attributes including the edges labeled with the appropriate transition probability 
 37 
from node to node.  For example node 6 has a certain probability that it can be obtained 
from node 1 and that is shown as edge P16  
 
Figure 2: Sample of Attribute/Relation Graph 
By representing an identity as a collection of attributes as shown in Figure 2, one 
represents an identity abstractly.  This abstraction focuses on the connections between the 
attributes for a generic identity.  It is possible to use this model to overcome the 
limitations of looking at identity strictly from a single identity provider’s perspective 
since multiple attributes can be used by different identity providers [88].  The collected 
attribute types for each instance of an identity are distinct.  The edges between the 
attributes are the only means of showing overlap or relation between each of these 
attributes.  To extend the model to support additional attributes and connections, the 





1 Consider a possible identity 
attribute 
2 Determine if it exists in the 
existing model 
2a Check for a misspelling of 
attribute type and possible 
names for the type 
2b Check for an attribute that has a 
dual meaning and update 
possible names for the type 
3 Add a new attribute 
4 Model the relations that the new 
attribute has with existing 
attributes 
4a Select Related Attributes 
4b Select Edge Type 
4c Add new Edge 
5 Repeat until complete 
Table 4: Modeling Approach for Addition of New Attributes 
3.2.1 Probability of Compromise 
Establishing the Probability of Compromise property, or PC, is built upon a graph 
for reasoning about preference between identity attributes. In the model of a social 
digraph with attributes connected to each other, “attributes most likely to be 
compromised” are defined by popularity.  Popularity is represented through a graph 
centrality measure called Eignenvector Centrality.  The “attributes most likely to be 
compromised” are the most “popular” based on how connected an attribute, say Attribute 
A2 is to other attributes and the weights of those connections described by the probability 
that Attribute A2 can be compromised given an attribute it is connected to. Thus, more 
connectivity (popularity) and higher probability weight means the attribute A2 can be 
reached by transitioning from many different other attributes with greater likelihood.  
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Put differently, the more reachable the attribute is from other attributes, the more 
likely it will be compromised.  Compromise is modeled as the ease of obtaining an 
attribute given the compromise of another attribute.  The aforementioned random walk 
across all of the attributes inside this graph will be represented as a digraph.  If an 
attacker obtains one attribute randomly, he can move randomly throughout the graph 
compromising other connected attributes without regard to the attribute he started on.  
The identity graph is also posited to be a closed system. Thus, an attacker looking to 
compromise a person’s identity will attempt to gain more information about that person. 
The attacker focuses on obtaining one attribute, which can sometimes involve several 
traversals through the graph.   
Another necessary property to consider is connectedness.  After assessing graph 
connectedness in this model, there is one Closed Communicating Class (CCC) with a few 
attributes not connected to that CCC.  Therefore, the node popularity within the graph can 
demonstrate steady state conditions.  The analysis on the steady-state condition of the 
digraph ultimately provides equivalence to Probability of Compromise for each attribute.   
For the purposes of this digraph, it is only necessary to understand what transition 
probabilities between the attributes exist.  The transition probability between each 
attribute is based on the edge transition probability, represented by the weight of the 
edge.  A total probability of transition from node i to node j is shown in the below 
equation where I(Pij) represents presence of an edge between nodes. 
𝐼(𝑃!")
1  𝑖𝑓  𝑃!"   ℎ𝑎𝑠  𝑎𝑛  𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒  




These edges are directional. This formula will be called the transition probability 
generator or TPG.  The Transition probability between nodes i and j is then represented 
by the below equation.   
𝑃!!! = 𝐼 𝑃!" ∗ 𝑃!" 
In order to derive Pij, one must understand the probability of compromising node j 
from node i. In order to come up with a more concrete prediction, existing data was used 
from The Center for Identity Threat Assessment and Prediction (ITAP) model.  The ITAP 
offers data to populate the social graph to define an identity. The ITAP represents the 
processes by which criminals steal and fraudulently use identity attributes.  Currently, 
there are about 2700 stories captured in the model.   This research automatically extracts 
attributes from the ITAP and represents those attributes as nodes in the social graph.  The 
edges are created by an exhaustive search of the ITAP theft and fraud stories describing 
the process steps by which identity attributes are used to compromise other attributes.  
The probabilities along the edges are calculated as the likelihood that attribute j is 
compromised given attribute i.  In other words, the weighted edge from attribute i to 
attribute j is calculated as the number of times that a certain attribute j, is 
obtained/compromised given another attribute i divided by the total number of times that 
attribute i is used to compromise other attributes including j.  These probabilities are 
represented as the weighted values on each edge of the graph above (Figure 2).   The 
equation that supports Pij is listed below: 
 
𝑃!" =
𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠  𝑜𝑓  𝑗  𝑜𝑏𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚  𝑖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠  𝑜𝑓  𝑖  𝑎𝑠  𝑎  𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛  𝑜𝑓  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 
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All of the edge probabilities exiting each node sum to 1.  Thus, the digraph model 
for calculation of node centrality fits the eigenvector centrality measure.   This technique 
is applied to the social graph to show node preference, which this research defines as the 
attribute node most likely to be compromised. 
As previously discussed, these transition probabilities can be related in a 
transition matrix within the bounds of the digraph.  This transition matrix combines all of 
the values of transition probabilities from the TPG’s a single matrix shown below.  This 
matrix becomes a square matrix because each node in the graph is related using the TPG 
to every other node in the graph exactly once.  Note that the due to the attribute model 
and the derivation of Pij, each diagonal term is set to 0 since it is impossible to remain in 








Once modeled, the matrix is fully populated with the transition probabilities 
between all nodes.  Since all probabilities from each i must sum to 1 the process can be 
considered stochastic.  Once the matrix is determined to be stochastic it can then be used 
for popularity computations.  Some further analysis is required to determine its suitability 
for computation.  After analyzing the transition matrix Pij the period is found to be 1; 
thus, the model is aperiodic.  Next, the model was analyzed for recurrence.  It was 
determined to be positively recurrent because there is a finite probability of returning to 
each state in the matrix.  Thus, the transition matrix Pij is found to be irreducible, 
aperiodic, and positively recurrent.  This means that the matrix is not transient but 
converges at some time before infinity. 
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In order to express the influence of each node in the network, the adjacency 
matrix Pij is written as the eigenvector equation below: 
𝑃!"𝑥 = 𝜆𝑥 
 
The Eigenvector of the matrix Pij represented by λ is the steady state probability of 
landing on a node in the graph. The vector λ represents the state space of the solution to 






Since the PC is solely dependent on the connections between the attributes, it is 
important to ensure these are modeled correctly and that the model is flexible enough to 
accommodate their change.  The identity provider would like to optimize these attributes 
such that any single attribute that is commonly collected during the enrollment process 
across multiple identity stores is not weighted too heavily in authorization decisions.  For 
example, an email address is more likely compromised than most other attributes.  This 
also means there is a ready path to most of the other attributes.  
3.2.2 Probability of Fill 
The Probability of Fill property, PF, is a means to describe the usage of attribute 
types.  The below equation represents the probability that a single attribute value will be 
filled.  The variable mi represents the attribute type and is set to 1 if a particular 
instantiation of the attribute type m is set.  The identity repository has n instantiations of 





Therefore the probability of fill is a simple weighted average of all of the customers in an 
identity repository that have the attribute.   
Liu expresses the importance of understanding how often a single attribute type is 
used in the computation of trust [6].  While Liu focuses on direct interactions of agents, 
the general concept is applicable to the model in this research.  The property can be 
calculated as a single or across multiple models, meaning the property is useful for one or 
more credential providers.  If a single credential provider doesn’t use an attribute, then 
others might choose to and the lower PF drives the preference lower for that attribute due 
to less usage.  It adds information related to usage that is not used in the PC metric.  PF is 
a representation of the number of attribute types in use in a single model or single identity 
repository.  For example, if a Social Security number is used for every account inside the 
model, then the SSN attribute type node has a PF value of 1.   
 Probability of fill can also apply across identity repositories.  If a single identity is 
considered, the same equation can be used with n representing the number of repositories 
the identity is stored in.  Without considering the fill of attributes, compromise could not 
be effective in the computation of attribute preference.  If compromise were only used to 
calculate preference, then it would be possible to prefer that is low risk for compromise 
but is never used.  This could provide a false motivation to an identity provider to prefer 
certain attributes  
3.3 EXPERIMENTS 
The following experiments were conducted to determine the effectiveness of the 
PC and PF metrics in providing attribute preference.  The combination of these metrics 
will allow identity providers to more properly weight attributes based on their fill and 
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compromise characteristics.  This weighting will allow dynamic decisions about which 
attributes to trust.  The Identity Ecosystem dataset was compared with a dataset that is 
derived from a US Army identity repository [101].  The high level details of each dataset 
after modeling are shown in Table 6 below. 
 
Metric Identity Ecosystem Army Attributes 
Number of total 
attributes 
104 18 
Number of edges 1435 104 






Expected Value of 
Distribution 
.0445 .02326 
Attribute with highest PC Social Security Number OrganizationalUnitName 
Table 6: Difference in Attribute Models 
The US Army identity dataset contains a small number of attributes.  In order to 
model and analyze it for this research, experts were interviewed to determine the edges or 
connections between the attributes [102].  This dataset was chosen for two reasons.  First 
the number of attributes was small.  The small number of attributes can help to determine 
the similarities of a small-scale model to the ID Ecosystem.  Secondly, the attribute types 
were of different syntax than the ID Ecosystem model.  This overlap provides an 
opportunity to update the ID Ecosystem model with new attributes to add to its richness..  
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As indicated in the modeling section, in order to be useful a model must be able to be 
continually updated.  
3.3.1 Experiment 1: Calibrate PC 
The modeling process in Table 4 was followed to perform the probability of 
compromise calculations for the two different attribute sets –attribute set from ITAP and 
attribute set from U.S. Army.  The first of these sets is based on the ITAP data [103]. The 
ITAP data looks across over 3000 compromises of Identity Attributes.  The compromise 
probabilities were based on the formulas in section 3.2.1.   The result is a calculated 
Probability for Compromise for each attribute based on the available data in the social 
graph created from the ITAP data. Based on the modeling activity, some attributes are not 
connected and thus factored out of the analysis, leaving a closed communication class on 
the digraph. Figure 3 shows steady state compromise probabilities for each attribute. The 
attribute number identifier is on the x-axis and the steady state compromise probability 
on the Y-axis.  
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Figure 3: Attribute Preference for Compromise 
 
The calibration of the Identity Ecosystem shows that there are a small number of 
attributes with a higher probability for compromise.  These attributes are especially prone 
to be compromised as shown in Table 9.  An Identity Provider could choose to change its 
process of identification of its users to focus on those attributes, which are at lower risk 
for compromise.  This is important because it can help to stem the significant desire of 
Identity providers to continue to collect more and more information.  Also, eventually the 
more an attribute is used, the more likely it is to become compromised.  This model can 
allow an Identity provider to reason about emerging attribute connections and change 
preference to match the attributes with the lower PC values.   
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In a similar fashion, the US Army dataset was considered.  The US Army dataset 
reflects attribute information taken directly from the Army Knowledge Online repository, 
which currently functions as the authoritative data source for the U.S. Army.  The 
compromise probabilities were based on the formulas in section 3.2.1.   The result is a 
calculated Probability for Compromise for each attribute based on the available data in 
the social graph created from the Army data. Based on the modeling activity, some 
attributes are not connected and thus factored out of the analysis, leaving a closed 
communication class on the digraph. Figure 3 shows steady state compromise 
probabilities for each attribute. The attribute number identifier is on the x-axis and the 
steady state compromise probability on the Y-axis.  
 
 
Figure 4:  Trendline Steady State Compromise Probability Army Dataset 
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The calculations using of the US Army dataset similarly shows that there are a 
small number of attributes with a higher probability for compromise.  These attributes are 
especially prone to be compromised as shown in Table 9.  With this information, the U.S. 
Army could consider changing its process of user identification to focus on those 
attributes, which are at lower risk for compromise.  This is important due to the cost of 
collecting and updating attribute information as well as the consequences of stolen (i.e. 
compromised) identity attributes.  The fewer attributes collected and used, the more 
money that can be saved by the U.S. Army.  If those attributes have a lower Probability 
of Compromise, the U.S. Army also incurs less risk with those collected attributes.   Also, 
eventually the more an attribute is used, the more likely it is to become compromised.  
This model can allow the Army Knowledge Online to reason about emerging attribute 
connections and change preference to match the attributes with the lower PC values.   
3.3.2 Experiment 2: Vary the Number of Edges connected to a Node 
In order to demonstrate that the model provides a Probability of Compromise that 
varies as connections to attributes vary, the below sets of experiments were conducted.  
These experiments verify that the model is sensitive to the changes in identity attribute 
relations.   
Experiment 2a- If the number of edges with an indegree to any node is decreased, a 
corresponding change in the PC value for the attribute will occur. 
Conditions- The experiment is run first on the highest connected attribute decreasing the 
number of edges it has to other nodes. 
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Results- As the number of edges to an attribute decreases, the Probability of Compromise 
decreases as shown in figure 5.  Further it is noted that the highest PC value in the graph 
changes between attributes and varies independently of the decrease in node PC value. 
 
Figure 5: Probability of Compromise for InDegree across 10 trials 
The results show that as an attribute is less connected to other attributes, the Probability 
of Compromise goes down.  In order words the less paths that can be taken from the 
attribute to a random attribute will lower the Probability of Compromise.  The decrease in 
Probability of Compromise verifies the model expectation that as fewer attributes have an 
ability to derive the value of a connected attribute there should be less compromise.  
Experiment 2b- If the number of edges with an InDegree to any node is increased, a 
corresponding change in the PC value for the attribute will occur. 
Conditions- The experiment is run first on the highest connected node on each attribute 
increasing the number of edges going out to other nodes. 
Results- As the number of edges going out of an attribute increases, the Probability of 
Compromise for that attribute increases as shown in figure 6.  Further it is noted that the 
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highest PC value in the graph changes between attributes and varies independently of the 
decrease in node PC value. 
 
 
Figure 6: Probability of Compromise for InDegree Across 10 Trials 
The results show the converse of the first experiment is true.  These results indicate that 
an attribute that is more connected has a higher Probability of Compromise.  The increase 
in Probability of Compromise verifies the model expectation that as fewer attributes have 
an ability to derive the value of a connected attribute there should be less compromise.   
The behaviors of attributes in the graph demonstrate some useful properties.  The 
first property is that the highest probability attribute in the graph doesn’t fluctuate 
significantly when edges are changed.  This can be useful for identity providers to 
determine their preference for attributes.  If they are able to adjust their approach to focus 
on using attributes with lower probabilities for compromise, they can be assured that the 
attribute most at risk for compromise will not fluctuate significantly.  The lack of top end 
fluctuation cannot be guaranteed with the empirical method used.  Since, the real world 
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attributes have a significant risk of compromise, with enough work it would be possible 
to raise the compromise probability of a specific attribute very high by a significant 
degree of compromise in a measured time period.  The change in probability wouldn’t 
raise the relative ranking of the attribute necessarily but it makes it less computationally 
feasible for Identity providers to use in the choice of attributes for authentication.   
3.3.3  CALIBRATE PF 
Since PF is used across multiple identity repositories, it becomes a useful detector 
for demonstrating how much an attribute is used.  For example, if identity repositories 1 
and 2 require a firstname as part of the enrollment process, then one would expect that PF 
for that attribute would approach 1 given that it is required.  As PF scales to multiple 
identity repositories the metric appears to have a linear relationship.  Figure 7 shows the 
relationships of PF across 4 different hypothetical identity providers. 
 
Figure 7: Relationships of Attributes with Differing PF values Across Identity Providers 
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Many of the attributes in use are not likely be filled, which indicates that either 
identity repositories do not present the ability to fill these to users, or they are unpopular. 
The use of PF is local and only effective when a large number of providers report their 
statistics.    
The PF value for an attribute is somewhat difficult to calculate in practice due to 
the need to understand the run time usage of these attributes within an identity provider.  
In theory however, fill probability is very useful.  As demonstrated in the experiment, it 
helps to inform identity providers about which attributes are most used.  This is a useful 
property when combined with the attributes that are most compromised.  If for example, 
an attribute provider were to prefer an attribute with a lower probability for compromise, 
but high fill probability, then there is a higher chance that if that attribute were to be 
compromised anywhere it could be used to exploit the identity then if there was an 
attribute with the same compromise probability and a lower fill probability.  Both metrics 
are useful for calculating attribute preference.  In the research reviewed, probability of fill 
was not taken into account in determining the preference of an attribute.  For example 
Blaze et al[23] is concerned about the usage of attributes by identity providers with 
respect to preference but conveniently leaves out the idea of measuring it.  It appears that 
most current research doesn’t use this metric because it is hard to define practically.  It is 
however possible for Identity providers to build a means of sharing this information with 
each other without revealing specific identities, trade secrets or compromising details 
about their inner workings.  That is a possible avenue for future work.  
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Chapter 4: Identity Trust 
Attribute preference alone is not sufficient to answer the question of whether an 
identity is truly trusted.  One must consider the question of usage of the identities that 
contain the attributes.  Without any sort of approach for calculating authenticity of an 
identity, the only source of trustworthiness in the assertion is whether attribute types 
match in value.  If an attribute can be verified such as SSN then the identity is deemed 
trustworthy.  Leveraging existing information about the identity and the attributes used to 
enroll that identity helps to add a degree of fidelity to the trust calculation.   
RQ2: Can the reliability and authenticity of an identity in a transaction help demonstrate 
trust to an identity? 
Building on the RQ1’s calculation of attribute preference, RQ2 leverages 
available information at the start of a transaction.  With a better idea of which credential 
attributes are preferred, the calculation of trust can compute authenticity with a 
comparison to specific attribute considerations such as fill and compromise.  This 
comparison yields a factor representing the trustworthiness of a credential’s source based 
on the types of attributes that it uses.  Another comparison can be made between the 
values of each of the attributes.  If the values of attributes (e.g. for an instance of an SSN, 
person’s name on SSN card) in one credential supporting an identity don’t match the 
golden records within the identity provider, the overall trust probability will be smaller.  
This chapter explores these and other comparisons.  
4.1 EXAMPLE SCENARIO FOR TRUST CALCULATION 
Based on the Reiter’s principle of trust calculation [9], we assume that a user may 
gain access to resources by presenting a credential, but acknowledge that a user does not 
necessarily own the credential. To illustrate this concept, we use the hypothetical 
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example scenario of “Alice,” a consultant with a United States federal agency (USFA), 
specializing in software analysis. USFA employees have access to different resources in a 
cloud delivered by ABC Industries, a security-conscious private company.  Alice and her 
collaborator Bob both have credentials from ABC Industries. While working on an 
important project together, Alice shares her credentials with Bob and asks him to retrieve 
critical files from the cloud. Now, regardless of his intent, Bob has compromised Alice’s 
identity.  
And let’s say that Alice and Bob travel to a customer site and work together from 
a hotel. Mavis is in the room next door and uses simple, publicly available tools to 
capture hotel network traffic and intercept Alice’s credentials to ABC Industries. Mavis 
uses the intercepted credentials to access ABC Industries’ computers and resources while 
impersonating Alice. Further, Mavis is able to use Alice’s credentials to set up other 
accounts and impersonate Alice on social networking sites. Other identity providers may 
use these accounts to verify Alice’s identity, and so on.   
Overall, given the critical nature of the resources stored in their cloud, ABC 
Industries needs to improve existing identity verification methods to ensure that Alice 
and Bob are who they say they are. Such improvements will aid ABC Industries in 
granting Alice and Bob the access they need to perform their separate functions, while 
still maintaining the integrity of their individual user information.  Such a scenario seems 
to be commonplace in online transactions, and multiple solutions have been developed to 
increase user-identity trustworthiness based on credentials, including encryption, multiple 
factor tokens, and secured networks.  However, these solutions fail to solve the 
fundamental problem of authenticating a user’s identity: How can we ensure that a user is 
who he or she says they are?  Therefore, this research makes the following assumptions 
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in creating a new method for calculating user-identity trustworthiness from a provider’s 
perspective: 
• Trust is bound to a credential. If any attributes change, trust in the credential must 
also change. 
• Trust in the user is transitive throughout the system; trust in a user is passed on to 
the resource via the identity provider. 
Based on these assumptions, this research posits that users can be identified with greater 
confidence by calculating trust using transactional context and behavior. 
 
4.2 IDENTITY TRUST CALCULATION 
The following section discusses an approach for calculating user-identity 
trustworthiness. The attributes identity providers collect during an online transaction are 
compared with reference data about the offered identity (i.e., the identity a user offers 
during enrollment). These comparisons yield a probability representing the 
trustworthiness of a user’s identity based on the frequency, types, and values of 
attributes.  
4.2.1 Model-Based Approach for Trust Calculation 
This section provides a model that can be used as a frame of reference for 
evaluating different components of user-identity trustworthiness, each component is 
represented as a graph. Using a graph-based approach allows the model to interconnect 
seemingly unrelated concepts and perform computations. For example, if attribute type 
A1 has a certain value n, then that value can be mapped to different types of attributes, 
transactional contexts, and identity indices. These connections have properties that will 
allow for the direct computation of authenticity and reliability. 
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Transaction. The first component to model is the transaction. Let U1 be the node 
(person or entity in a network) initiating the transaction, and U1 communicates a 
transactional context [A0…An]. Let I0 be the user identity.  Let the identity provider 
maintain a golden record with all of the attribute types and values used when U1 enrolled 
with the identity provider.  The transactional context is composed of the user’s identity 
and its associated attributes (see Figure 9). It is important that the transactional context is 
indexed by an offered a declared identity such that it can be used in subsequent 
calculations to ensure consistency or detect errors.  
 
 
Figure 9: Transactional Context 
 
The identity provider maintains data about the relationship between values of attribute 
type A, and the associated identity, I0. Different levels of user-identity trustworthiness 




Figure 10: Transactional Context and Reference Attributes 
 
In this case, the trust calculation will be focused on unidirectional trust from the identity 
provider to U1. U1 can present some or all of its attributes to the identity provider.  The 
identity provider maintains a model of indexed identities, user attributes, and values. 
Indexed identities are simply connected attributes, and each attribute has a type and value 
as reflected in the below sample. The notation An is an attribute type and each bracket 
shows values. These nodes are strongly connected through the relationship property 




A(33){name:Anchorage} - … 
 
Each identity stored within an identity repository is represented with a set of nodes and 
























node, and connected by edges with all of the different nodes containing values for that 
type. Thus, it is easy to compute the number of times an attribute is used by summing the 
edges that have the relationship TYPE_OF.  
Attribute. The next identity aspect to model is the attribute. Each attribute type is 
represented as a node in a graph. These nodes are connected with relationships 
representing the interdependent nature of identity attribute types. A portion of the graph 
is shown in Figure 11.   
 
 
Figure 11: Identity Attribute Relationships 
The graph contains a root node, which provides an index point of all of the other 
nodes.  These nodes each represent a different identity attribute.  Each attribute node is 
one edge of the root of the graph. Each attribute has some type of relationship to another 
attribute, and these relationships are weighted. For example, a Social Security number is 
necessary to receive a Social Security card. The value of the necessary_for relationship 
can be modified as necessary to fit the particular type of computation. When analyzed, 
the attributes, and their associated edges and relationships, can be represented as a 
probability matrix [95].  This matrix offers the ability to answer questions such as:   
• Which attribute is used most frequently? 
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• Are there certain attributes that should be protected more than others? 
4.2.2 Trust Algorithm 
To successfully decompose the available transaction data into measures and 
subsequently allow computation, the following algorithm is proposed:  
 
Algorithm 1. Trust Generation Model 
Input:  Node Set {A0…An} called TC1 
Output: The Rel Ai, Auth Ai.  
index = 0; Numα =n;  
repeat  
        TCα = Findsubset(TC1, index);  
        Found = TRUE;  
        for each node Ai do  
         ValAi= Count Same Ai Values); 
 NumAi=Count all Values of A  
 AuthAi=ValAi/NumAi 
            Return AuthAi 
       for each node Ai do  
             ValAi= Count Same Ai Values); 
 NumAi=Count all Values of A  
 RelAi=BinomAi(ValAi,NumAi) 
            Return RelAi 
 
        until FreNumα > n;   
 
A transactional context is available at the beginning of a transaction and conducted with a 
set of attributes {A0…An}. These attributes have values and are categorized by types such 
as Social Security Number, Mothers Maiden name, etc... during pre-processing. After 
transactional context is obtained, the list of the golden record for the identity is obtained 
by searching the graph using the People index at a depth of 1 to all of the reference ID 
nodes. The search is represented as: 
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For all Identities, In, Return number that contains types An with matching values 
 
When an identity is read, its value of access time is updated. If no matching identity 
nodes are found, then the algorithm creates a new identity reference node and adds the 
associated attribute types and values. These attributes are linked to the reference for their 
type and value.  Each attribute type is checked for value matches inside the set of 
reference identities.  This number of matches is returned and used in the computation of 
authenticity.  For practical reasons in a graph model, a set corresponds to a set of 
connected nodes with edges that take the value ISCONN.  Thus, during a depth-first 
search of the graph, each of the TC attributes are compared to the reference type, traced 
to reference index nodes, and confirmed as connected.   
Finally, once Algorithm 1 has run, computations can be made to determine a 
belief metric for the identity attempting the transaction.  Neuman et al. [93] uses a 
weighted Dempster-Shafer approach combining reliability, availability, and promptness. 
These authors posit the approach can be extended to combine any two human 
characteristics of trust, as long as each has a probabilistic value and the approach 
specifies the uncertainty of the characteristics.  Let the universal set be Θ. Reliability and 
authenticity assign probability values over this universal set.  The below treatment 
applies the Dempster- Shafer approach to the computed values for authenticity and 
reliability.  The following equations derived from standard Dempster-Shafter 
combination theory represent the necessary steps to combine the sources.  
 
𝑚: 2! → [0,1] 
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Where 2X represents the power set of Θ or {0,{R},{Au},X} and where R and Au 
represent reliability and availability, respectively.  
If m(Θ) is equal to 0, then the mass of the reliability and authenticity variables are 
represented as follows: 
 




When combined, the joint mass of reliability and authenticity is represented by the 
following equation, where K is uncertainty:  
 
𝑚!,! 𝑅 = 𝑚1+𝑚2 𝑅 =
𝑚1(𝑅)!!!"!!
1− 𝐾  
 
The value of m_1,2 (R) can be returned as a probabilistic value between 0 and 1. Thus 
m_1,2 (R) becomes the reliability-biased value for belief-based trust in identity.  The 
same calculation can be performed with the authenticity as the lead variable with similar 
results.   
 Although useful for combining informational probabilities about a certain event, 
Dempster-Shafer theory is inadequate for the case of combining authenticity and 
reliability.  Both authenticity and reliability are describing information about the same 
identity with its associated transactional context, which is a necessary precondition for 
the use of the Dempster-Shafer combination.  However, it can be shown in the following 
sections that the two metrics analyze attributes differently.  Thus they combination of the 
to would provide incomplete and possibly inaccurate information.   
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4.3 RELIABILITY 
When a user offers an identity to a provider, a necessary component of 
trustworthiness is the ability to assess reliability. Just as trust exists between people, 
repetition of an appropriate behavior is necessary to continue building trust. In the 
example scenario, reliability equates to using the same credentials correctly and 
repeatedly. In the Belief Based Trust Model represented in algorithm 1, user-identity 
trustworthiness is computed from the perspective of the identity provider, and we focus 
on computing the reliability of the attributes presented.  
Modeling reliability can be performed with probability distributions considering 
each interaction as a trial, and the overall user interaction with the identity repository 
considered as a sequence of trials [74]. In the example scenario, let xi represent a match 
of each attribute presented by Bob and modeled as an independent random variable. The 
sequences of hits are treated as iid.  
Taken together in a sequenced set, the attributes correspond to the transactional 
context from Bob using Alice’s credentials and thus assuming her identity. The resource 
provider, ABC Industries, asks, “Can I trust that these presented attributes belong to 
Alice?” This question can be answered by calculating the probability that each presented 
attribute belongs to the identity that presented it.  In this scenario, the presented attributes 
can be matched to an existing model of attributes for Alice’s identity. Since such 
matching is possible, we can easily model reliability as a set of Bernoulli Trials.  These 
random variables will either match an attribute in Alice’s indexed identity or not. 
 Reliability as a metric is able to detect the repeated valid or invalid use of an 
identity.  It is a useful measurement in a similar way to the use of reputation.  Existing 
reputation based trust approaches assign a 1 or a 0 value to an actor based on a 
transaction [55].  This is insufficient when attempting to look deeper then just the actor.  
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For example an identity can use some attributes validly and others invalidly.  Thus the 
reliability score can account for this mixed usage.  A traditional reputation based 
methodology would consider the transaction invalid due to a single use of an attribute 
incorrectly.  As Reiter said, some information is always valuable [9] regardless of the 
quality.   
4.3.1 Reliability of Attributes 
 When considering reliability, it is crucial to look at attributes both as standalone 
items and as a grouping that forms an identity. A presented attribute can be considered 
reliable if its value is consistent with past values presented for that particular identity.  In 
the example scenario, this means that the more that Alice asserts her FirstName attribute 
correctly, the reliability of that attribute type increases.  
More formally, let Alice’s FirstName attribute type stored with her identity be 
represented by AI. Let the attribute presented as part of the transactional context be 
represented by A0. Let each time Alice’s identity attribute is presented be represented as a 
trial. Each trial should be considered independent. The independence assumption is 
required in order to correspond with how identities are used in the domain.   
A user can conduct a transaction with the identity provider based on the type of 
protocol used by the identity provider. However, Alice’s presented attribute could also be 
used simultaneously in another transaction with a malicious user. Thus, it is possible that 
many transactions in a row contain the same value for A0.  Furthermore, let us assume the 
values of A0 to be a set of random variables. One possible trial outcome is the value of an 
attribute of type A0 matching the value of type AI. Thus, the state space S is defined as 
{0,1}, with 1 representing a successful match and 0 representing an unsuccessful match. 
We posit the following expression models the probability that presented Attribute A0 
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matches the reference identity attribute across any number of trials n following binomial 
cumulative distribution function:   
 




This equation provides a way to consider reliability across a certain n set of trials. The 
long run percentage of successful matches could indicate overall reliability, but this 
would not weigh the most recent transactions high enough. Using the binomial pdf above 
yields the ability to focus on most recent trials following a running estimate.  This 
equation uses the probability of authenticity as the binominal probability, allowing PR to 
increase greater across a lower number of trials when the attribute is more unique. This 
approach allows for modification of the independence assumption to provide for a more 
realistic view of the trials.   
For example, Alice could be a long time customer of a certain identity provider. 
Several years ago, her identity could have been compromised when she incorrectly 
presented an attribute multiple times. If Equation 1x were to hold in this situation, then 
those probability estimates would be equally weighted with more recent negative 
matches. Thus, the independence assumption would be applied across a series of trials n 
in the Equation 1 asserting that each trial inside the most recent set of trials n is 
independent.   
Let us call the probability in Equation 1 the recent reliability. The variable n will 
be fixed as a sliding window across the total lifespan of the attribute. Let k-1 be the 
number of successful matches in the time window n where k-1<n. Accordingly, k will be 
the number of successful matches in the current trial, assuming that trial is successful. 
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Thus, the probability in Equation 1 will directly relate to the instantaneous reliability in 
the current transaction. This transaction timeline is represented in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12:  Example Transaction Timing 
In Figure 12 the time of the current trial t0 is used to calculate the recent reliability, 
where n=6 trial and k=4 successes (assuming that the trial is successful). Therefore, the 
recent reliability of rating at t0 is more relevant to the current context than if p had been 
calculated over the life of the attribute type. Following the approach from Equation 1 
would yield similar results for reliability across the set of trials, illustrated by Figure 13.  
 
 
Figure 13: Trial Responses 
 
n
x,=1 x,=0 x,=1 x,=0 x,=1
t0
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As n is varied, the number of trials necessary to predict a positive match would 
increase as represented by the spacing between the blue and red curve. This behavior 
allows the calculation to be flexible enough to vary sensitivity as necessary for a 
particular set of domain conditions. The amount of time required to go from a negative 
match expectation to a positive match expectation is based on p, allowing the overall 
system reliability to provide bearing for the sensitivity of transition.  
By delivering a measurement of the reliability of an attribute following equation 
1, it is possible to get a view of attribute reliability across multiple transactions.  
Following the binomial approach still allows two outcomes reliable or not reliable but it 
allows the consideration of information some of which may be conflicting.  Assessing 
conflicting identity information is necessary and sufficient for identification of a person 
or user[24, 26, 30].   
4.3.2 Reliability of Identities 
To define an identity as reliable, two conditions must be met: (1) the attribute 
types must be consistent across multiple transactions; and (2) attribute values must be the 
same across multiple transactions.   Once reliability is asserted across any set of 
transactions, it can be used as a predictive metric.  As previously discussed, a binomial 
distribution works well to represent reliability of an attribute. In terms of trust, the whole 
identity must be considered either trustworthy or not based on the grouping of attributes.  
In the example scenario, we expect Bob not to be a reliable user because he knowingly 
violated the provider’s terms of service when he offered Alice’s identity. The question, 
though, is to what degree Bob is considered unreliable. Following the attribute summary 
above, we can expect that reliability strictly depends on two factors: (1) the number of 
times an attribute matches represented as k; and (2) the size of the window of time in 
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measured in transactions represented as n. The below equation represents an approach for 










The above equation states that the reliability of the offered identity is a binomial 
function of n, k, and p.  The variable n represents the total number of trials conducted or 
the number of times that the presented identity has been used to conduct transactions.  
The variable k represents the window size that is being considered for reliability.  The 
window size represents the amount of transactions considered for whether or not a user is 
reliable.  It can be sized high relatively to n if more precision is required but lower for 
less transactions and more recent data is required. The variable PA represents the 
probability that the attributes used matched or the authenticity probability.  PA will be 
explained more in Section 4.4.  
4.4 AUTHENTICITY 
In addition to reliability, authenticity is a necessary to establish user-identity 
trustworthiness in online transactions. From this perspective, the study of identity 
resolution focuses on resolving identities and usage probabilistically based on a set of 
incomplete data. In effect, researchers are trying to match identity attributes with an 
index record held by the identity provider. In identity resolution, accuracy is a measure 
often used to demonstrate the success or failure of a particular algorithm [94]. 
Authenticity of attribute data can also mean s decision to trust was correct, if the index 
identity has matching attribute data [5].  Xiong[5] provides a confirmative view of trust 
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with attribute matching.  This research proposes authenticity as a method to use attribute 
matching to establish a primary model for trust.    
In the Trust Generation model (Algorithm 1) presented in this research, 
authenticity is based on the premise that a presented set of attributes corresponds with the 
person presenting them. Recall that in the example scenario, Alice gave Bob all of the 
information necessary to impersonate her. Therefore, we can assume that Alice would 
also share all of the necessary attributes to fully conduct an authentication transaction. 
We can also assume that all presented attributes correspond with the identity provider’s 
indexed information about Alice’s identity.  In order to verify Alice’s identity, the set of 
attributes Bob presents on behalf of Alice would need to be at least a subset of the 
attributes available in Alice’s indexed identity.   
 
Presented Attributes{A0, A1, …, AX}   Index Identity{A0, A1, …, AY} 
 
Let Au be the authenticity of presented attribute. Let Ax be the attribute being evaluated 
for authenticity.  Authenticity will be characterized based on the amount of indexed 
identities that contain the presented attributes as a set. The below equation calculates the 







Au is then represented as a real number from 0 to 1.  The calculations for Acorrect and 
Aincorrect are shown below.   






𝐴!"#$%%&#'(𝐼) = 1− 𝐴!"##$!%(𝐼) 
An attribute is found to be matched or taking a value of 1 for Ai if the attribute value can 
be exactly matched to the golden record for the attribute of that particular identity. The 
value of V(Ai) represents the number of attribute values matching the presented one 
within the golden set.  Therefore the authenticity is both a function of how correctly the 
attribute is used and how many attributes are a direct match.  Au is also inversely 




Figure 14: Authenticity vs. Number of Possible Occurrences of Value 
In the example scenario, it is likely that Alice has a higher authenticity rating then Bob 
because her name is less common, and thus less likely to be used in the set of index 
identities. Au can only be values inside the real number set {0..1}. Thus, it can be 
combined with other attribute values using the previously described Dempster-Shafer 
approach to determine a belief metric.  Identity providers can use the authenticity metric 
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to provide a comparative view of how unique a user’s attributes are.  It has the added 
ability to detect changes while at the same time detecting incorrectly used attributes.  
Existing trust mechanisms focus on the user as a whole including all identity attributes.  
They conduct a comparison to achieve a right or wrong answer and then provide that 
feedback to another trust engine.  Authenticity has the ability to detect individual invalid 
attributes as well as those, which closely match other identities.  If the identity were 
unknown or uncertain at the time of a transaction, it would be possible to use authenticity 
to produce a ranked order guess of the true identity based on the attribute values.  More 
importantly, authenticity in this context has the ability to substantiate an assertion of 
identity through a probabilistic result.   
4.5 EXPERIMENTS  
The following experiments demonstrate that identity reliability and authenticity 
metrics defined by this research can enable more accurate trustworthiness assessments by 
an identity provider.  If the attribute values vary significantly across multiple 
transactions, the reliability is too low and the provider loses trust in the identity.  
Additionally, a set of identities having a high number of instances with the same attribute 
values will lack uniqueness.  Decreases in uniqueness (authenticity) decrease the ability 
of an identity provider to trust a given identity since others appear similar.  The 
authenticity experiments combine attribute uniqueness numbers across all attribute types 
discussed in the previous section. 
 In order to demonstrate this trust-based approach a test set of identities obtained 
was analyzed by using an approach used by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
[92].  This dataset contained a sample of 50,000 identities that were representative of the 
population. The transaction data set is representative of the US population based on a few 
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properties.  The first is the set of attribute types used: FirstName; LastName; Company; 
Address; City; County; State; ZIP; Phone; Email.  The second is the cultural alignment of 
the names.  Miller’s team ensured that the names followed the cultural groups 
composition in society(circa 2009) 71% “American Names”, 17% Anglo, Arabic, and 
Hispanic, ~9% Chinese Korean, Russian and Southwest Asian, ~3% French, German, 
Indian, Japanese and Vietnamese.  The third property was to ensure that not all names 
were proper.  Of the names chosen 1% were segmented into variants or nicknames.   
The experiments were conducted to demonstrate reliability and authenticity responses 
when variables are varied (see Table 7). 
Each experiment was configured to use the known set of identities from an 
identity provider.  These were instantiated in a graph database in order to support 
efficient querying.  These known identities will be referred to as golden record identities.  
Each time a transaction was conducted an identity with associated attributes was 
compared to the golden record in the database.  Depending on the type of experiment, 
this approach was used to quickly and easily find attribute types with the same values, 
and it also keeps track of the number of times an attribute type and value are used across 






















Reliability Response to 
Random Attribute 
Types (4.5.1.1) 
Varied [1-10] 10 Varied [5-
500] 
500 










to Variation in 
Transaction Number 
(4.5.2.1) 






to Attribute Types 
(4.5.2.2) 
Varied [1-10] 10 Varied [5-
500] 
500 
Table 7: Reliability Experiments 
Each experiment followed the computation of trust probability outlined in 
algorithm 1.  First a transactional identity with a set of attributes is compared to existing 
ground truth identities. Once a set of possible ground truth identity nodes was returned, 
the remaining computations were performed on vertices connected by edges to that node. 
Each identity node was connected to a root index; this allowed one command to return 
the appropriate node (with up to 5 billion nodes) in less than 1s of database search time.  
This approach was able to efficiently find matches and return the necessary information.  
The maximum depth of traversal from the reference node was 3, with a breadth that 
depended on the number of stored attributes [95].  
4.5.1 Reliability Experiments 
The first metric, reliability of a user’s identity, demonstrates the user is 
consistently who he or she claims to be, thereby increasing trustworthiness.  In order to 
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prove that the reliability metric helps to indicate trustworthiness in an identity, we 
analyzed a set of transactions and varied the values provided for each attribute as well as 
the type of attributes used.  For example, if Alice provides her address correctly in a 
string of multiple transactions, the reliability metric should be higher than if she provides 
it incorrectly in the string of transactions.  The first experiment focused on determining 
how the reliability metric changed as each attribute’s value varied between correct and 
incorrect for a specific identity over a period of transactions.  Attribute types and attribute 
values per type were varied.  The second reliability experiment built on the number of 
transactions in the first experiment by fixing the number of attributes used across all 
transactions and increasing the number of transactions.   
4.5.1.1 Reliability response to random identity attributes. 
 The reliability metric was tested for responsiveness to changing identity attribute 
types and values.  This experiment was conducted in a series of transactions that took a 
set of 10 identities and varied the attribute values and the attribute types.  For example 
Alice would only communicate 3 personal attributes in one transaction while 
communicating 8 in another.  Each transaction could have a random number of attributes 
that matched her ground truth identity.  Reliability values for each of these identities were 
measured as each transaction was conducted.  
It was hypothesized that if the number of attributes types per identity are varied 
randomly while the number of transactions per identity remains constant, then the 
reliability of each identity will be following a binomial increasing pattern so that 
reliability increases as the number of attribute types per identity increases following a 
pattern similar to the graph in figure 13.  The experiment ran with a variation of 3 to 10 
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attributes per identity for each transaction. The number of same values per attribute type 
was varied from 5 to 500.  Each identity conducted 10 transactions.   
The hypothesis was verified.  In Figure 15, each data point represents identity 
transactions with a certain number of attribute types.  The reliability for each attribute 
was higher for those attribute types with larger numbers of similar values. Furthermore, 
when the amount of attributes per identity was low, the reliability was also low. In terms 
of user-identity trustworthiness, this is a useful indicator for calculating trust in an 
identity.    
 
 
Figure 15: Reliability and Random Identity Attributes 
These results can be applied to the example scenario by considering the case 
where Bob leverages Alice’s credentials.  If ABC Industries (the identity provider) had 
full knowledge of Alice’s attributes and Bob only knew a few, such as her username and 
password, then Bob’s reliability would be low if he were interrogated for more than just 
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the two attributes types that he knew.  If Bob could only assert the two attributes 
correctly over a set of transactions, Alice’s identity reliability score would not rise 
significantly.  It is interesting to see how the reliability value for Alice’s identity varies 
with more transactions perhaps at some point allowing her to conduct a transaction with 
the identity provider and reliably providing more of her attributes.  
These results demonstrate that it is possible to gain a higher reliability by 
requesting more attributes.  Practically, this is important to identity providers because 
they can choose to request a lot of attributes to achieve a high degree of trust in a 
transaction.  Requesting more attributes can streamline the identity provider’s business 
process.  It already collects a significant amount of information about its users and being 
able to leverage it for a greater degree of trust could also save money.  The Identity 
Provider would potentially be able to avoid investing in higher integrity attribute 
enrollment methods.  
4.5.1.2 Reliability response to variation in transaction number.   
Since an identity provider has to exist for longer than a fixed set of transactions, 
reliability must be tested across a large set of transactions. As users conduct more 
transactions, the reliability metric for each identity should increase due to the increase in 
time window assuming that the number of attribute types is fixed. This experiment also 
varied attribute values over a large set of transactions.  Fixing the number of attribute 
types provided by a user should then ensure that reliability is calculated by numbers of 
matched attribute values.  This situation would accurately reflect an identity provider like 
Google who might focus on a certain number of attributes types for a transaction but they 
have a wide population of users whose attribute values should be expected to vary 
significantly.   
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It was hypothesized that if the number of attributes types per identity remains 
constant while the number of transactions per identity is increased, then the reliability of 
each identity will increase as the number of transactions increases.  The first experiment 
ran with the full complement of 10 attributes per identity for each transaction. Each 
identity conducted between 10 and 50 transactions. 
Figure 16 shows a sample set of 10 identities from the 500 analyzed. Overall, 447 
identities experienced an increase in the reliability over the set of 50 transactions.   
Identities initially had attributes values that didn’t match ground truth, as the number of 
transactions increased each attribute still had a large number of correct values.  This 
increase in the number of correct values directly led to an increase in the overall 
reliability of the specific identity being tested.  In other words, an identity is more reliable 
when more of its attributes have been used more correctly across a larger number of 
transactions.  The mean reliability for the set of Identities was 0.46.  The mean 
transaction time to pass the mean reliability was 26 transactions.  Surprisingly, the 
reliability numbers for this dataset passed .46 after 35 transaction runs. The large number 
of same attribute values for each transaction might explain the relatively low set of runs 
required for the reliability metric to approach 1.  The jump in reliability is significant due 
to the choice of the window size.  Since there are 50 transactions being considered, it 
takes approximately half of those to transition to a more reliable state.   Thus it becomes 
important for a potential identity provider using this metric to choose the window size 




Figure 16: Reliability vs. Number of Transactions 
Overall, 53 identities experienced a variable reliability instead of the expected 
increase. After revisiting the experimental configuration, we discovered those identities 
shared some characteristics including a larger number of duplicate values. For example, 
31 identities shared the same first name. This finding suggests increasing the number of 
transactions may not impact reliability with a large number of similar attribute values 
across the identity set.  These results are significant to example scenario if the reader 
considers Alice and Bob’s transactions over a long period of time.  If Bob is presented 
with situations where he entered nonmatching attribute values (attributes values that did 
not match those known as ground truth by the identity provider) for a long enough set of 
transactions, Alice’s identity reliability value will decrease.  This behavior could be 
useful to an identity provider as they could set a flag at a specified reliability value and 
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take some kind of remedial action in response to an unreliable identity, such as 
deactivating the account or forcing a password reset. 
These results demonstrate that it is possible to gain a higher reliability by 
conducting more transactions.  Practically, this is important to identity providers because 
they can choose to allow a lot of transactions to achieve a high degree of trust in certain 
scenarios where the user is consistently engaging in transactions.  Often it can take 
several identity transactions for the user to get readable information from the service 
provider.   From the identity provider’s perspective this would be valuable to gain a 
higher degree of trust in the user being authenticated without requiring any additional 
infrastructure or algorithms.    
4.5.2 Authenticity Experiments 
An identity with more unique values is considered more authentic; these values 
can be leveraged to increase trustworthiness.  For example, many people may have the 
name “Alice Jones,” but fewer people named Alice Jones live on East Fifth Street, and 
even fewer have the same phone number.  Thus, the more attributes types and more 
unique attribute values exist, the greater the authenticity metric in the user-identity 
trustworthiness calculation offered in this research.  This metric would be easy to 
measure if all possible attribute values and types for a system of identities are known, and 
if the system is closed. But in reality, transactional systems are open, and identity 
providers must deal with how to measure authenticity with incomplete information about 
the identities that will conduct transactions.   
4.5.2.1 Authenticity response to variation in transactions by attribute.  
Remembering the definition from section 4.4, authenticity will be characterized 
based on the amount of indexed identities that contain the presented attributes as a set.  
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Since an identity provider has to service more than a fixed set of transactions, the 
authenticity must be tested across a large set of transactions.  As users conduct more 
transactions, the authenticity metric for each identity should increase due to increased 
attribute types matched to a single identity.    
For example, as transactions increase, Alice Jones will supply more information 
about herself and the authenticity of her identity will increase as more attribute types are 
used.  This experiment fixed the number of attribute types with a variation in user 
attribute values over a large set of transactions.  Fixing the number of attribute types 
provided by a user should then ensure that the authenticity would reach an upper limit. 
This situation would accurately reflect an identity provider like Google, who might focus 
on a certain number of attributes types for a transaction, but also have a wide population 
of users whose attribute values should be expected to vary significantly.  Therefore, if an 
identity is used across several transactions, and attributes types are fixed each time while 
the attribute value is held varied, the identity’s authenticity should increase as the 
experiment proceeds.  This experiment was conducted with the further assumption that a 
user conducting it wasn’t malicious and had full knowledge of an identity. 
It was hypothesized that if the amount of attributes types per identity remains 
constant, the authenticity of each identity will increase linearly based on the number of 
transactions.  The experiment was run 5 times with a different number of attributes each 
time.  The number of values for each attribute type was varied across the set of 
transactions.  All identities conducted transactions until they reached the highest 
authenticity score possible.  The number of attribute values per attribute type varied 
across the set of transactions. 
This hypothesis was verified providing proof that authenticity is dependent on 
both number of attribute types and transactions.  The authenticity for each attribute type 
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depended only the number of transactions and not the number of duplicate attribute 
values (see Figure 17).  Each identity used in a transaction was measured. Figure 10 
displays 5 sample results from the experiment.  It took about 50 runs for the Identity to 
reach maximum value with 5 attribute, and 192 with 1 attribute.  The findings support the 
hypothesis that authenticity increases as the number of transactions increase.   One 
notable behavior is that it takes a significant number of transactions to reach peak 
authenticity with only one attribute.   
 
 
Figure 17: Authenticity and Number of Transactions 
This type of experiment is useful in the context of scenario 3 because if Alice had 
been conducting transactions with ABC’s identity provider, she would constantly be 
providing more identifying attributes about herself thus increasing her identity’s 
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authenticity.  The expected response of this metric would be to decrease the authenticity 
as the amount of correct identity attributes were decreased.  The decrease would support 
a case where an account was created for a fake identity and the user conducting the 
transactions didn’t have the full set of attributes needed by the identity provider.    
An identity provider can find the authenticity metric useful due to the relatively 
short amount of time necessary to converge on a high authenticity value.  Once the 
identity has achieved authenticity, due to the number of transactions conducted, it stays 
high.  It can be asserted that as the number of valid transactions decreases the value falls 
just as fast.   This property is more useful because an attacker might take a few times to 
correctly guess attributes of the user’s identity and thus produce a low reliability value.  
The next section will discuss what happens when the number of valid attributes is varied.   
4.5.2.2 Authenticity response to variations in the number of attributes.   
Authenticity will be characterized based on the amount of indexed identities that 
contain the presented attributes as a set.  Building on the results from the previous 
experiment, it is useful to understand how authenticity varies with respect to number of 
attributes.  In order to demonstrate this a certain number of identities can be studied with 
respect to their attribute usage.  This should clearly indicate whether number of attributes 
affect authenticity.  One would expect that as Alice Jones will supply more information 
about herself and the authenticity of her identity will increase as more attribute types are 
used correctly.  This experiment chose a fixed number of identities varying the number of 
attribute types used to conduct transactions.  Finally, this experiment was conducted with 
the further assumption that a user conducting it wasn’t malicious and had full knowledge 
of an identity. 
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It was hypothesized that the authenticity of an identity will increase as the number 
of attribute types used for transactions increases.  The first experiment with 10 identities 
and varied the number of attribute types used.  All identities conducted 50 transactions.  
The number of attribute values per attribute type varied across the set of transactions.  
This hypothesis was verified substantiating the view that the more attributes used 
correctly, the higher the authenticity value.  The authenticity for each identity depended 
only on the number of attribute types and not the number of duplicate attribute values 
(see Figure 18).  Each identity used in a transaction was measured across the full set of 
transactions. Figure 18 displays 10 identities from the experiment.  
 
Figure 18: Authenticity vs. Number of Attributes. 
As the experiment progressed, each identity eventually matched enough attributes 
from the transactions to increase the identity authenticity.  Authenticity values reached 
their peak at about 8 correct attributes. This peak is representative of the transaction set, 
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which had the same amount of valid and invalid transactions for the first 7 attributes.  As 
the set of attributes went higher then 8, the validity of the attributes stayed high. 
An identity provider can find the authenticity metric due to the relatively linear 
increase in authenticity vs. the number of attributes.  This property is more useful because 
an identity provider decide to increase attributes requested and have an expected return 
authenticity.  A simple comparison of values can allow the identity provider a view into 
how may return attributes are invalid.    
 
4.5.3 Reliability with Attribute Preference 
The first metric, reliability of a user’s identity, demonstrates the user is 
consistently who he or she claims to be.  For example, if a person uses identity attributes 
that are more likely to be compromised to identify him or herself, then the reliability of 
his or her identity should decrease.  In order to prove that the attribute used is important 
to the calculation of the reliability metric, a set of transactions was analyzed that varied 
the values provided for each attribute, as well as the type of attributes used.  However, if 
the attribute has a higher PC, then the reliability number should decrease proportionally.  
Thus, equation 3 can be modified to show improved reliability as shown below: 
 
Equation 4    𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑒𝑙(𝐼!) =






Improved reliability adds the Probability of Compromise as a multiplier to the 
existing probability of matching the particular attribute. Returning to the example, if 
Alice provides her address correctly in a string of transactions, the reliability metric 
would be higher than if she provides it incorrectly in the string of transactions.  However, 
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if she provides her address incorrectly in a string of transactions, and also provides her 
SSN correctly in a string of transactions, the reliability metric should increase more than 
proportionally.  Leveraging the results from the first reliability experiment set, a 
comparison was made between calculating reliability with a random set of attributes and 
specific types.    
It was hypothesized that if the number of attributes types per identity is varied 
randomly while the number of transactions per identity remains constant, then the 
reliability of each identity will be higher as the Probability of Compromise for an 
attribute decreases.  This experiment ran with from 1 to 10 attributes per identity for each 
transaction.  The number of values for each attribute type was varied across the set of 
transactions.   All identities conducted 50 transactions.  The number of attribute values 
per attribute type varied across the set of transactions.  This experiment was run three 
times.  The first time randomly selected the attribute types, the second time selected the 
attributes with the top 10 highest Probability for Compromise, and the third time selected 
the attributes with the bottom 10 highest Probability for Compromise.   
This hypothesis was verified demonstrating that Improved Reliability was indeed 
affected by the number of attributes by type.  The attributes with the higher probability 
compromise scores yielded lower reliability scores.  The attributes with the lower 




Figure 19: Improved Reliability Results 
 
The Improved Reliability Metric yielded statistically significant results with a mean 
difference of .021999 in a t-test with a standard deviation of .01021 and 9 degrees of 
freedom.  The conclusion is that the improved reliability metric is more useful then the 
standalone reliability metric due to the addition of PC in the calculation. 
 However the Improved Reliability metric shows insufficient for prediction of 
reliability based on types of attributes used.  Ideally, the metric would return a 
statistically significant higher value for the attributes, which are less likely to be 
compromised.  Unfortunately there is not a significant enough change to show that the 
attributes used have bearing on the improved reliability metric.  This leads the 
dissertation to try a different approach.   
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Chapter 5: Identity Risk 
Trust in an identity is not enough to answer the question of whether a resource 
provider should grant access or authorization to a user.  Basic trust in identity provides a 
probability that the identity is correct.  However, there still is not a method for 
interpreting this probability as a useful assessment for access control decisions.  
Improved Reliability proved insufficient to use attribute compromise probabilities in the 
assessment of validity of an identity.   Modifying Kim’s approach [99] to consider risk as 
a decision to trust based on 3 factors seems an appropriate method to try.   
Recall that RQ3 asked:  Is the risk posed by an identity a reliable predictor of the 
validity of the identity?  This question involves reliability, improved reliability and 
authenticity measures for attributes, and identities.  According to Kim, et al [99], trust 
and its antecedents including reliability can be an accurate predictor of risk in an e-
commerce environment.  Therefore it makes sense to leverage these measures to 
determine the risk posed by the identity in the following scenario.    
5.1 EXAMPLE SCENARIO FOR RISK CALCULATION 
Based on Kim’s principle that trust affects perceived risk in an identity [99], the 
risk in a user gaining access to resources should be based on all available information 
about that user.  To illustrate this concept, let us revisit the hypothetical example 
scenario.  Once again, Alice is collaborating with Bob and Mavis intercepts their 
communications.  This time, however, ABC Industries sets up defenses against the faulty 
use of credentials, challenging the authenticator with a knowledge-based tool that 
requires another attribute of the end user to verify authenticity.  Initially, this seems like a 
reasonable solution to the reliability and authenticity problems presented in the previous 
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chapter.  Unfortunately, the attribute has a Probability of Compromise that is not 0, and to 
compensate, ABC has to understand the risks an identity can pose to their infrastructure. 
Such a scenario seems to be commonplace in online transactions, and multiple 
solutions have been developed to increase user-identity trustworthiness based on 
credentials including encryption, multiple factor tokens, and secured networks.  However, 
these solutions fail to solve the fundamental problem of authenticating a user’s identity: 
How can we ensure that a user is who he or she says that they are?  Therefore, this 
research also makes the following assumptions in creating a new method for calculating 
risk from a provider’s perspective: 
• Risk is dependent not only on the trustworthiness of the credential used but also 
on the attributes used to create that credential. 
• Risk is a useful tool to aid in authentication decisions.   
Based on these assumptions, this research posits that users can be identified with greater 
confidence by calculating risk using trustworthiness techniques and existing information 
about attributes. 
5.3 IDENTITY RISK CALCULATION 
The following section proposes an approach for calculating risk for a user-
identity.  The attributes presented with the identity are combined with the trust value 
gained from the reliability and authenticity metrics to form an identity risk assessment.  
The risk model is based on the identity models discussed in previous chapters.   The 
definition of identity remains consistent and risk is calculated for a specific identity.  In 
general, the risk model follows the pattern presented in Figure 20. 
The risk calculation determines the probability that users presenting identities are 
who they say they are, based on all available information.  This is a function of their 
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reliability, authenticity, and the Probability of Compromise of the attributes that they 
present.  A key design feature of the two trust metrics is that they are expressed as 
probabilities. Viewing the problem as a set of probabilities allows the ability to exceed 
the Dempster Shafer and Improved Reliability approaches.  In order to combine these 
metrics, a few approaches for combination of probability were investigated.  The 
approach must reasonably combine potential conditionally dependent data.   
 
 
Figure 20: Risk Assessment Approach 
One approach is to use a Bayesian Network [38, 39, 75] to determine the combine 
modalities of these component probabilities.  For example, Bissiri’s approach uses a 
Bernoulli combination technique to combine disparate identity information [38].  
Muncaster shows that a Bayesian approach can encode a multivariate set of probabilities 
for identity attributes such as biometric data [75].  The authors assume an unknown 
posterior distribution to enable them to fine tune their inferences.  These techniques are 
both useful in different ways and can be leveraged for the combinations of trust metrics 
with the PC for each attribute.   
The following model details the combined probability approach to computing 
risk.  Let the compromise Probability, PC for an attribute be independent from the 
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reliability and authenticity metrics for identity.  The conditional independence 
assumption is valid because PC is the Probability of Compromise for a specific attribute.  
PC is derived directly from the attribute graph that details connections between the sets of 
attributes.  However, PR, and PA are possibly dependent.  Therefore, they will be treated 
as conditionally dependent for the sake of the computation.  
 
The behavior can be modeled by using a stochastic process.  Since reliability is a 
way of judging the trust placed in an identity based on its use of attributes, PR for I0 
would be combined with PC (I0) to show the risk for that identity.  Figure 21 represents 
the stochastic process that defines risk for an identity.   
 
 
Figure 21: Risk Stochastic Process 
Let S be the initial state of an Identity during a transaction.  Let S1 be a choice to 
rely on the identity and S3 be a choice to determine its unreliability.  S can transition to 
S1 with a probability p, which is 1-PR.  S can also transition to S3 with a probability of q, 
which is PR.  A transition to one of the states describes a higher probability to be reliable. 
This stochastic model, however, makes a decision about the reliability of the user in the 
context of Probability of Compromise of the attributes used for that particular transaction.  
S1 can transition to S2 with a probability of r or S4 with a probability of s.  S3 can 
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transition to S4 with a probability of r or S2 with a probability of s.  The variable r 
denotes a compromise Probability PC and s denotes 1-PC. The r transition is made then the 
attributes in the identity PC(I) are considered not compromised.  S5 and S6 follow the 
same pattern except to consider authenticity with respect to reliability.  If a t transition is 
made then the identity is shown to be authentic whereas with a u transition the identity is 
not authentic.  
Since PC generally reflects geometric distribution, the threshold for determination 
is made based on the mean.  After parametric regression smoothed distribution was 




Figure 22: Fitted Probability of Compromise Distribution 
The PDF of the fitted function is 𝑦 = 𝑒!.!""#! with a mean=.045.  Thus, the decision to 
move to S2 or S4 is based on whether the attributes are considered compromised based 
on the mean value.  This process is provably stochastic as it is composed of two 
transitions that sum to 1.  The system is a closed communicating class and positively 
recurrent.   






















This stochastic model is valid for a single transaction.  When repeated across multiple 
transactions, this stochastic process can be generalized as a Bayesian Network for 
computational purposes.  Following the process in Muncaster [75], this stochastic process 
is decomposed to a simple Bayesian Network shown in Figure 21.   
The network can be optimized across a large set of transactions to provide a risk 
calculation for each transaction.  The Bayesian network is also extended to include the 
authenticity probability.  Extending the network provides the ability to consider the 
amount of same valued attributes within an attribute type.  An identity provider such as 
USFA in the example scenario would be able to make an informed judgment about the 
risk posed to their network, as each transaction occurs based on all of the available 
metrics.  The joint probability function that defines the overall risk probability is: 
 
𝑃 = (𝑃𝑒,𝑃𝑎,Pr) = 𝑃(𝑃𝑒|𝑃𝑎,Pr) ∗ 𝑃 𝑃𝑎 𝑃𝑒 ∗ 𝑃𝑒 
 
The most useful questions for calculating a valid risk, along with their associated 
equations, are:    
1. What is the probability that an attribute asserting the identity is compromised if 
the identity is not reliable? 
 




2. What is the probability that an attribute asserting the identity is compromised if 
the identity is not authentic? 
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3. What is the probability that an attribute asserting the identity is compromised if 
the identity is not authentic and not reliable? 
 
𝑃(𝑃𝑒 = 𝑇|𝑃𝑎 = 𝐹,𝑃𝑟 = 𝐹) =
𝑃(𝑃𝑎,𝑃𝑒,Pr) ∗ 𝑃(𝑃𝑒|Pr)
𝑃(Pe |𝑃𝑎)  
 
4. What is the probability that an attribute asserting the identity is compromised if 
the identity is authentic and not reliable? 
 
𝑃(𝑃𝑒 = 𝑇|𝑃𝑎 = 𝑇,𝑃𝑟 = 𝐹) =
𝑃(𝑃𝑎,𝑃𝑒,Pr) ∗ 𝑃(𝑃𝑒|Pr)
𝑃(Pe |𝑃𝑎)  
 
5. What is the probability that an attribute asserting the identity is compromised if 
the identity is not authentic and reliable? 
 
𝑃(𝑃𝑒 = 𝑇|𝑃𝑎 = 𝐹,𝑃𝑟 = 𝑇) =
𝑃(𝑃𝑎,𝑃𝑒,Pr) ∗ 𝑃(𝑃𝑒|Pr)
𝑃(Pe |𝑃𝑎)  
 
Each of these equations can be summed to produce the likelihood that an identity is not 
accurate.  The likelihood that an identity is not accurate reflects a value that shows the 
risk for the transaction.  This risk value is useful for detecting invalid transactions.  An 
invalid transaction is defined as one that a user submits as an incorrect value for an 
attribute type.   
There could be several reasons for an invalid transaction such as a person 
forgetting their password, or a user maliciously attempting to use another identity.  Since 
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the risk model has to predict whether an identity is valid or invalid, the probabilities 
calculated must be divided up into a binomial distribution to choose validity.  The Probity 
model chooses a mean that is represented by PR* across both types of transactions if the 
transaction has a valid probability that falls above the mean, then that is a predictor that 
the user will be valid.  The probit model is represented by the below equation where x is 
the value of an individual data point for risk: 
Probability(PR=1|x)=Probability(PR*>0|x) 
 Since the valid and invalid probability sum to 1, the invalid probability will 
automatically be below the PR*.  If the transaction has a valid probability that falls below 
the PR* and the invalid probability is above the mean that is a predictor that the identity 
will be invalid.  A graphical view of valid and invalid probabilities graphed against 
attribute type.  Figure 23 represents a calibrated view of data that was used to create the 
improved reliability metric.  It is obvious that at above 6 attributes, the risk model from 
figure 21 is almost perfect at prediction with prediction thresholds set very small around 
0 and 1.  With 6 attributes or less, the prediction threshold sizes need to increase a little 
bit to make precise predictions.  There is some error in the model but the overall accuracy 
of prediction is 72.6%.  This is significant as it can be used as an improvement to the way 
that service providers conduct transactions.  For example, if service providers could 
predict with a high degree of accuracy which of the identities they let through were 
invalid, they could supplement their authorization mechanisms.  These mechanisms could 
adapt dynamically to changing conditions rather then just require a set of attributes to 




Figure 23: Risk Probability vs. Attribute Type 
The domain of information retrieval works best to evaluate this type of approach.  
Table 8 shows the measurement approach for the results of the risk probability 
calculation.  The first applicable metric applicable is the precision.  A true positive is 
represented by an identity shown as valid based on its probability falling above the mean 
in the Probit model..   
 
 
Table 8: Test Outcomes 
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A false positive occurs when a record is assumed valid based on the validity being above 




𝑇𝑝 + 𝐹𝑝 
 
Building on the precision measure, mean average precision (MAP) can be used 
across the dataset to determine the relative utility of the risk measurement approach.  
MAP is derived by first calculating an average precision value for each query in the 






Another measure to determine the utility of the risk calculation is accuracy.  In order to 
understand accuracy, another term must be defined.  A true negative occurs when the 








The following experiments allow for better reasoning about how to combine 
belief and reputation modalities to best develop an assessment risk metric associated with 
a given identity. The specific measure will be described in terms of precision, accuracy, 
and mean precision.  The overall risk calculation will be realistically computed based on 
the example scenario.  The expectation is with all metrics, the risk model should be a 
 96 
good predictor of an invalid transaction. Table 9 below breaks down the experiments with 
associated variables.  Each experiment ran with 800 transactions.   
 
Experiment Section Measurements Number of 
attribute types 
1 
5.5.1.1 Risk Accuracy combining 
Attribute Compromise and 
Authenticity 
Varied [1-10] 
5.5.1.2 Risk Precision combining 




5.5.2.1 Risk Accuracy combining 
Attribute Compromise and 
Reliability 
Varied [1-10] 
5.5.2.2 Risk Precision combining 




5.5.3.1 Risk Accuracy combining 5 
valid risk probabilities 
Varied [1-10] 
5.5.3.2 Risk Precision combining 5 
valid risk probabilities 
Varied [1-10] 
Table 9: Experimental Approach  
5.5.1 Usage of Authenticity to determine Risk 
The risk metric was tested for variations in accuracy for changing numbers of 
attribute types.  This experiment ran a set of transactions in order to calculate risk using 
only Probability of Compromise of all attributes used by an identity and authenticity.  
This experiment was conducted in a series of transactions that took a set of 16 identities 
and varied the number of attribute types.  For example, Alice Jones communicates 3 
personal attributes in one transaction and 8 in another.  Each transaction could have a 
random number of attributes matching her ground truth identity.  Risk values were 
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measured for each of these identities as each transaction was conducted following the 
same procedures in Chapter 4. 
 
5.5.1.1 Risk Accuracy Response to Variations in Number of Attribute Types  
It was hypothesized that if the number of attributes types per identity are varied 
randomly while the number of transactions per identity remains constant, then the risk 
accuracy of each identity increases as the number of attribute types per identity increases.  
The experiment ran with a variation of 1 to 10 attributes per identity for each transaction. 
The number of same values per attribute type was set at 20. Each of 16 identities 
conducted 50 transactions for a total set of 800 transactions. 
The hypothesis was verified demonstrating that there was variation of risk based 
on the number of attribute types used. The data collected is represented in Figure 24 
below.  In Figure 24, each data point represents mean accuracy for an attribute type.  
Accuracy clearly increases as the number of attribute types used increases.  When the 
amount of attributes per identity is low, the authenticity is also low.  This is a possible 
factor of the sharp rise in accuracy.  
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Figure 24:  Accuracy Response by Attribute Type 
The low authenticity values for a small amount of attribute types is expected 
because an identity proves itself more authentic as it uses larger amounts of attribute 
types to identify itself.  Put differently, the fewer identity attributes are used, the higher 
the risk of that user if risk depends on authenticity.  Clearly, the attribute probabilities of 
compromise are used because they tend to level the accuracy of the risk metric.  For 
example, it can be asserted the relationship is not fully linear because attributes 9 and 10 
have a higher Probability of Compromise.  It is expected that since the accuracy of risk 
prediction generally increases as the number of attributes increase, that a service provider 
would request more attributes be used in order to get a higher risk accuracy.   
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5.5.1.2 Risk Precision Response to Variations in Number of Attribute Values per Type 
This section focused on combining Probability of Compromise of all attributes 
used by an identity and authenticity.  The experiment was conducted in a series of 
transactions that took a set of between 16 identities and varied the number of attribute 
types.  Risk precision values were measured for each of these identities as each 
transaction was conducted.  
It was hypothesized that if the number of attributes values per identity is varied 
randomly while the number of transactions per identity remains constant, then the risk 
precision of each identity increases as the number of attribute types per identity increases.  
The experiment ran with a variation of 1 to 10 attributes per identity for each transaction. 
The number of same values per attribute type was set at 20. Each identity conducted 50 
transactions. 
Again, the hypothesis was verified. The data collected is represented in Figure 25.  
In Figure 25, each diamond represents the precision for identity transactions with a 
certain number of attribute types.  The precision is higher for those attribute types with 
larger numbers of similar values.  Furthermore, when the amount of attributes per identity 




Figure 25: Precision Response by Attribute Type 
The low precision values for a small amount of attribute types are expected, because an 
identity proves itself more authentic as it uses larger amounts of attribute types.  These 
low precision values are primarily due to the preference of the authenticity values 
towards detection of true negatives than detecting true positives.  Service providers 
should be concerned about a low precision at low levels of attribute usage.  Even with a 
somewhat high accuracy number an attribute provider who uses up to 4 attributes still has 
to deal with the potentially significant error introduced due to the low precision valid 
under. 5.   
5.5.2 Usage of Reliability to Determine Risk 
This section was intended to elucidate the changes in risk based on only 
Reliability and Probability of Compromise of all attributes used by an identity.  The 
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experiment was conducted in a series of 800 transactions that used a set of 16 identities 
and varied the number of attribute types.  The variation in attribute types was performed 
in order to understand the levels of risk posed by using different amounts and types of 
attributes.    Risk values were measured for each of these identities as each transaction 
was conducted following the same procedures in Chapter 4.  
 
5.5.2.1 Risk Accuracy Response to Variations in Number of Attribute Values per Type  
It was hypothesized that if the number of attribute values per identity is varied 
randomly while the number of transactions per identity remains constant, then the risk 
accuracy of each identity will increase as the number of attribute types per identity 
increases.  The experiment ran with a variation of 1 to 10 attributes per identity for each 
transaction. The number of same values per attribute type was set at 20. Each identity 
conducted 50 transactions. 
This hypothesis was also verified showed that there was variation of attributes 
used in the calculation based on the reliability metric.  The data collected is represented 
in Figure 26.  In Figure 26, each data point represents mean accuracy for an attribute 
type.  Accuracy clearly increases as the number of attribute types used increases. When 
the amount of attributes per identity is low, the authenticity is also low.   
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Figure 26: Accuracy Response by Attribute Type 
The low reliability values for a small amount of attribute types are expected the 
amount of less time an identity is used, the higher the risk of the user if risk is dependent 
on reliability.  Clearly, the attribute probabilities of compromise are used because they 
tend to level the accuracy of the risk metric.  Again, it can be asserted that the 
relationship is not fully linear because Attributes 9 and 10 have a higher Probability of 
Compromise.  The accuracy in this graph tends to follow the same pattern as that of the 
authenticity experiment.  The risk accuracy is low for the first few sets of attributes but 
moves significantly higher then the authenticity graph after 6 attributes.  This could make 
a case for combining the two metrics 
 
5.5.2.2 Risk Precision Response to Variations in Number of Attribute Values per 
Type  
During this experiment precision was also measured in risk values.   
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It was hypothesized that if the number of attributes values per identity is varied 
randomly while the number of transactions per identity remains constant, then the risk 
precision of each identity will increase as the number of attribute types per identity 
increases.  The experiment ran with a variation of 1 to 10 attributes per identity for each 
transaction. The number of same values per attribute type was set at 20. Each identity 
conducted 50 transactions. 
Again, the hypothesis was verified. The data collected is represented in Figure 27.  
In Figure 27, each diamond represents the precision for identity transactions with a 
certain number of attribute types.  The precision is higher for those attribute types with 
larger numbers of similar values. Furthermore, when the amount of attributes per identity 
is low, the precision is also low.  
 
 
Figure 27: Precision Response by Attribute Type 
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The low precision values for small amount of attribute types are expected because an 
identity proves itself more authentic as it uses larger amounts of attribute types.  These 
precision values for the risk metric using reliability are higher than those for authenticity. 
 
5.5.3 Combination of Reliability and Authenticity to Determine Risk 
In order to get a better risk values, the authors ran an experiment that combined 
authenticity and reliability.  The risk metric was tested for variations in accuracy to 
changing numbers of attribute types.  This experiment focused on all 5 useful measures 
of valid risk and was conducted in a series of transactions that took a set of 16 identities 
and varied the number of attribute types.  Risk values were measured for each of these 
identities as each transaction was conducted following the same procedures in Chapter 4. 
 
5.5.3.1 Risk Precision Response to Variations in Number of Attribute Values per Type  
It was hypothesized that if the number of attribute values per identity are varied 
randomly while the number of transactions per identity remains constant then the risk 
precision of each identity will be increases as the number of attribute types per identity 
increases.  The experiment ran with a variation of 1 to 10 attributes per identity for each 
transaction. The number of same values per attribute type was set at 20. Each identity 
conducted 50 transactions. 
Again, the hypothesis was verified demonstrating changes in precision due to 
changes in values per type. The data collected is represented in Figure 28.  In Figure 28, 
each blue diamond represents identity transactions with a certain number of attribute 
types.  The reliability for each attribute is higher for those attribute types with larger 
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numbers of similar values.  Furthermore, when the amount of attributes per identity is 
low, the reliability is also low.  This is a useful indicator for calculating trust. 
 
Figure 28: Precision Response by Attribute Type 
The low precision values for a small amount of attribute types are expected 
because an identity proves itself more authentic as it uses larger amounts of attributes.  
These precision values for the risk metric using authenticity and reliability are higher 
than those for each metric individually. 
5.5.3.2 Risk Accuracy Response to Variations in Number of Attribute Values per 
Type  
It was hypothesized that if the number of attributes values per identity is varied 
randomly while the number of transactions per identity remains constant, then the risk 
accuracy of each identity will increase as the number of attribute types per identity 
increases.  The experiment ran with a variation of 1 to 10 attributes per identity for each 
transaction.  The number of same values per attribute type was set at 20. Each identity 
conducted 50 transactions. 
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Again, the hypothesis was verified demonstrating a significantly higher accuracy 
even at low attributes.  The data collected is represented in Figure 29.  In Figure 29, each 
data point represents mean accuracy for an attribute type.  The accuracy clearly increases 
as the number of attribute types used increases. When the amount of attributes per 
identity is low, the authenticity and reliability are also low.   
 
 
Figure 29: Accuracy Response by Attribute Type 
When reliability and authenticity are combined, there is a much greater accuracy at each 
attribute type, which provides a much better predictor of overall risk.  Service providers 
can leverage both of these metrics to determine an adequate level of risk calculation.  
Service providers’ main focus has been to ensure that the right set of users is accessing it.  
If it is possible to accurately predict with even a small number of attributes used how 
risky a user is then it will make sense for the provider to adopt the methodology.  
Existing risk methods attempt to tie the risk to the type of data being accessed.  By 
providing a risk view based on the user who attempts to access this data, the service 
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provider can flip that approach on its head.  It can begin to adopt policies that use a 
certain level of risk to allow access to different domains.  The types of information in the 
domains do not have to be formally assessed for consequences before a compromise 
probability can be applied to it.  If the data is transactional in nature and meant to be 
accessed by users, then it is possible to this risk-based metric to meet service providers 
security needs.  
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Chapter 6: Analysis 
Overall, this research attempts to leverage techniques based on trust to increase 
the confidence in an identity.  Specifically the following hypothesis is considered: 
 
In an online identity-based transaction ecosystem, trust in users and their attributes can 
be measured and used to enable less risky transactions. 
 
Online transactions that leverage identity happen all of the time.  Use of identity forms 
the bases for all online transactions that require trust.  Users, service providers, and 
identity providers take unknown risks with every transaction involving an identity.  Thus, 
the goal of this research is providing a means for reducing risk by quantifying it in these 
transactions.  Once quantified, it is possible to use a risk value to make better judgments 
about how handling online transactions.  In order to clearly verify this hypothesis, let us 
turn to several additional research questions.    
6. 1 RESEARCH QUESTION 1 
The definition of identity in Chapter One indicates that an identity can be 
computationally modeled by grouping its attributes together.  With that understood, the 
first research question focuses on individual attributes:  
 
RQ1: Which attributes of Identity are most trusted? 
 
In order to answer the research question, the first necessary step is to define which 
attributes compose an identity.  The related work section of this dissertation discussed a 
few different types of models [18, 85, 86, 88].   Eventually, the Identity Ecosystem was 
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chosen as an initial model because of the view that all attributes were connected.  If all 
attributes of an identity are connected, then their connections must have some bearing on 
their utility.  In fact, Reider asserts that attribute utility is proportional to its 
connectedness [9].  Each attribute model acknowledges that no provably complete 
identity models of attributes exist [85, 88].  A modeling approach was proposed to extend 
the identity attribute model as new attributes are discovered.   
Often, it is asserted that some attributes can be similar or the same [85].  The 
modeling approach provides a way to differentiate through demonstration that certain 
attributes are different.  Two attribute models are listed in Table 8 with the following 
comparisons.  First, there are vastly different numbers of useful attributes with one 
having about 8% of the other.  After comparing the attribute names, about 46% in the 
Army model had a corresponding value in the identity model.  A conclusion to draw from 
the comparison is that differing identity providers had use for different types of attributes.  
This underscores the need for a reference model of attributes that functions across all 
identity providers.   
Previous chapters described Probability of Fill and Probability of Compromise 
and measured the utility of the two metrics.  It is also useful to compare them to existing 
research, but since identity security research is emerging, there are few significant studies 
for comparison.  However, a few comments can be made.  Probability of Fill is a good 
predictor of the usage of the attribute.  If an attribute is filled at an identity provider, the 
identity user at some point must have used it.  Thus this is a reliable predictor of usage 
but not a reliable predictor of its usage for any other function.  Since Reiter asserts that 
effectiveness of attributes is proportional to their usage and their ability to be 
compromised [9], then the focus should be on they potential for compromise. The 
potential for compromise is related to how many places a user has used their attributes. 
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For example, if a user enters the same password across 10 different sites, then a 
compromise of any is a compromise of all.   Just as important in Reiter’s definition is the 
compromise potential, which is not just a function of how many places the attribute is 
used, but also how it could be derived from other attributes.  If compromising one 
attribute can compromise another attribute, then the model must be able to account for all 
transitions between attributes.  This attribute model showing the preferred attribute of the 
Ecosystem is able to satisfy that constraint. 
It turns out that the method for calculation of Compromise of an attribute is also 
useful due to the correlation with recent studies on the most compromised attributes [32].  
The correlation is expected because attackers exploit one attribute based on another.   The 
correlation of the top 10 most compromised attributes to the choices made by the model 
are shown in the below Table 10.   
 




Social Security Number Social Security Number 
Date of Birth Date of Birth 
Full Name Mothers Maiden Name 
Account Number Email 
Online Password Account Number 
Drivers License  Drivers License  
Passport Passport 
Banking PINs License Plate Number 
Mothers Maiden Name Medical Record Number 
Table 10: Most Compromised Attributes 
The proposed identity model employing the social model graph with attribute 
nodes and transition probabilities derived from ITAP found 60% of the top 10 attributes 
reported in the Verizon study with the most compromised being the Social Security 
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Number. This dissertation found 60% of the top 10 attributes as compared to the Verizon 
data without looking at the attributed usage data or Probability of Fill.  If an attribute has 
a higher Probability of Compromise it is less trusted.   
6.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 2 
The definition of identity in Chapter One indicates that an identity can be 
computationally modeled by grouping its attributes together.  Grouping these attributes 
together provides a computationally feasible identity for reasoning about trust. 
  
RQ2: Can the reliability and authenticity of an identity in a transaction help demonstrate 
trust to an identity? 
 
Trust is contextual.  One minute an identity can be used in a correct manner by an 
authorized individual and the next the same identity or components of it could be stolen. 
Authenticity is primarily a function of trust in the contents of an identity used in a 
transaction.  Therefore, the experiments generally reflected a strong correlation between 
the number of attributes used and the authenticity value.  In order words, the trust is 
higher in a user who presents more attributes.  Reliability is primarily a function of trust 
in the usage of identity in a transaction.  Therefore an identity that uses attributes more 
consistently is shown as more reliable.  Both measures of trust are necessary to accurately 
reflect the degree of trust placed in an identity.  If just one or the other were used, it 
would be much easier to “game” the algorithm by exploiting its bias.   
 The experimental components of chapter 4 were designed to demonstrate that 
trust is useful in understanding the utility of multiple facets of an identity within a set of 
transactions.  An identity is shown to be more reliable as both the numbers of transactions 
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increase and the numbers of attributes used for those transactions increase.  This is a very 
useful result.  For example, section 4.5.1 demonstrates that an identity is significantly 
more reliable when more then 4 attributes are used.  This is a useful result to an identity 
provider seeking to design a protocol that used the least number of attributes that 
demonstrated the highest reliability.   
Similarly, the number of transactions to gain a higher level of reliability is also 
described in the second experiment in 4.5.2.  It took on average 26 transactions to pass 
the mean reliability threshold as shown in Table 11.  These would be transactions in 
which a user presented fully valid credentials.  This result has applicability to the 
protocol design community. Based on these results, it is possible to design a protocol that 
optimizes the number of samples of credentials to gain a certain threshold of reliability. 
 
 Authenticity Reliability 
Mean level 0.464 
 
0.4639 
Average number of 
Transactions to reach 
mean 
26 (1 Attribute) 
34 (2 Attributes) 
56 (3 Attributes) 
73 (4 Attributes) 
183 (5 Attributes) 
26 
Average number of 
attributes necessary to 
reach mean 
6 6 
Table 11: Authenticity and Reliability Data 
 The authenticity experiments also have useful results.  The authenticity mean 
across these transactions is .4641.  This is less important though then the slope of the 
authenticity curves.  Each identity tested has a very sharp increase in authenticity at some 
point in the transaction set.  Given the binomial nature of authenticity, it is useful as a 
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predictor because of the relative clustering of the data points at the low or high levels.  
RQ2 can be answered in the affirmative due to the responses in these metrics based on 
the representative set of data.   
6.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 3 
The work in previous chapters produced a computationally valid model for 
identity, which then can assume a value of trust in one of two dimensions: authenticity 
and reliability.  Once the degree of trust in an identity is calculated, those values can be 
leveraged to calculate risk.  The next research question reflects the nature of the risk 
calculated: 
 
RQ3: Is the risk posed by an identity a reliable predictor of the validity of the identity? 
 
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to use the trust metrics and then consider 
those as probabilities that an identity can be trusted.  In the experiments, several sets of 
transaction were run with identities from the dataset described in RQ2.  These 
transactions were then transformed into probabilities of risk.  These probabilities of risk 
then were put into a Probit model to determine the thresholds that would be used to 
consider an identity risky (see Table 12).   
 The thresholds in the Probit model are telling because they indicate not only the 
level at which an identity will be considered risky but also a range of uncertainty.  The 
combined risk model had the highest upper bound and the lowest percentage of 
uncertainty, with only 5 values or .625 percent of the data falling in between those 




Probit Model Risk (Authenticity) Risk (Reliability) Risk (Authenticity 
and Reliability) 
Lower Bound 0.314 0.477 0.219 
Upper Bound 0.686 0.523 0.780 
Percent of data 
uncertain 
2.88% 1.63% .63% 
Table 12: Probit Model Thresholds 
According to the Probit model, the combined authenticity/reliability risk metric provides 
the highest resolution on the data with the authenticity, and reliability not far behind.  A 
graphical view of how the data spreads out can be seen in Figure 30 for the authenticity 
risk metric.  Overall, the sensitivity of the model demonstrates clearly that the modeling 
approach provides a sound way to make a judgment of whether an identity is risky or not.  
Given the ability of the model to make a judgment of riskiness, the next level is 
the ability for the model to be an accurate judge of that risk.  Table 13 compares different 
types of risk calculated and the improved reliability metric.  The improved reliability 


































Rank 2 3 1 4 
Table 13: Rankings of Different Types of Risk Metrics 
These metrics were each run against the same set of transactions to determine which had 
the higher accuracy in prediction of a true identity.  Rather then comparing risk values, 
the best comparison to determine effectiveness is accuracy of the metric in determining 
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whether an identity matches one inside the golden set.  The model is configured such that 
if the risk value is higher then the Probit upper bound then it is considered a valid 
identity.  If the risk value is lower then the Probit lower bound then it is considered an 
invalid identity.  The combined authenticity/reliability risk calculation turns out to be the 
best predictor out of the 4 different risk calculations.  
 The research question can be answered in the affirmative that risk is a good 
predictor of identity to the degree that it is 72.6% accurate. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 Identification of a person or a thing remains a difficult problem but not 
intractable.  This work will form the basis for a new approach to online identification.  
While identity security is often about protecting the Personal Identifiable Information 
(PII) with techniques such as encryption and network, the heart of identity 
trustworthiness is not about securing the PII but determining if the PII can be trusted. 
This dissertation has taken a probabilistic view of identity asserting that there is no 
absolute identification.  Those probabilities have been evaluated across common Internet 
transactions such as authentication and authorization.   
 Many techniques and methodologies have been used in research to establish 
identity.  Most of these processes involve some form of strengthening of the base identity 
with additional attributes such as biometrics.  Much information already exists about 
people on the Internet, and identity providers capture it.  This existing information can 
strengthen the validity of identities used.  The lack of focus on the model of identity also 
drives a heavy reliance on increasing security on each transaction by developing new 
techniques and processes for needs such as authentication.  This dissertation provides a 
supplementary or alternate method to leverage existing information stored and 
transmitted during transactions to increase confidence in the user’s identity without 
requiring additional information.     
 Leveraging PII models from the Center for Identity [18] and the U.S. Army [101], 
this research reviewed identity models and the information used to comprise those 
models. The dissertation results assert that the connectedness of attributes in identity is a 
good predictor of their compromise.  Typical approaches are limited by relying on 
information that spreads across multiple physical locations of identity in order to 
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understand which attributes can be compromised and to what level of probability.  This 
dissertation looks across identity providers by simply looking at the personal model of 
identity attributes.   
In order to increase confidence through the usage of additional attributes, a model 
had to be developed that describes identity by its attributes.  A number of researchers 
have attempted to generate a standard taxonomy or model around identity.  None can 
adequately represent the identity as a computationally feasible model of attributes.  The 
attribute model used inside this dissertation will enable security researchers to generate 
more robust models and perform predictive analysis.  The modeling process defined will 
enable additional attributes to be added and analyzed.  Further, the addition of the 
attributes to compose a system identity model provide the ability to reason about and 
understand the behavior of other identity systems which are under constant attack today.  
In fact Identity Providers will be able to use those attributes at the time of identification 
and throughout the transaction to inform which attributes are requested.  Identity 
Providers will also be able to choose the correct set of attributes needed to inform their 
particular needs.  In the long run, this can slow the significant growth in the amount of 
attributes being requested of users.   
This research developed a trust model directly correlated to the attributes in 
identity to establish a degree of trustworthiness.  Leveraging identities and transactions 
developed using techniques by the Department of Homeland Security Identity resolution 
team [92] the trust model was evaluated.  Trust was decomposed into authenticity and 
reliability with each providing different information about how the identity could be 
trusted.  The reliability measure was also extended to determine the degree to which the 
Probability of Compromise of certain attributes affects reliability.  Trust as a notion is 
heavily used in a number of different areas such as modeling agents behavior [3], and in 
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peer to peer transactions [5].  It has never been applied to an abstract notion of identity.  
This dissertation shows that identity has sufficient properties to compute trust models 
between an identity and identity provider.  These can be used transitively to provide 
access to services.  The first trust metric proposed is an identity-based reliability metric 
that providing a concrete confidence value rather then assuming implicit trust in the 
system.  This reliability metric can be used to contribute to decisions in Authentication 
schemes for people and system based services.  Another contribution is the calculation of 
the authenticity of an Identity.  Although many reputation generators exist for trust-based 
approaches, adding authenticity as a property to Identity allows it to become more 
durable and usable in computations.  This measure was called improved reliability.  
Improved reliability was found to be a less accurate measure of a compromised identity 
then risk as investigated in RQ3.   
 Finally, a risk model offered by this dissertation research leverages the following 
calculations to ultimately determine whether risk is a good predictor of an invalid 
identity.   
• Reliability – The component of trust that expresses whether an identity is used 
correctly repeatedly.  Reliability provides for partial valid usage. 
• Authenticity – This component of trust expresses whether an identity uses the 
correct attributes.  It also provides a view of uniqueness of those attributes  
• Probability of Compromise – The probability that an attacker will be able to 
compromise any specific identity attribute given a connected attribute is known. 
The measurements were combined using a Bayesian network built around the 
identity model to determine a risk probability.  Using the three together will make it 
harder for attackers to exploit and game the system to provide favorable risk values for 
exploitation.  This risk probability was then divided using a Probit model to determine 
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whether the risk leaned toward a valid or invalid identity. The risk probability will also 
supplement service providers’ ability to grant access to resources over time.  Based on 
their needs, service providers will be able to dial up or down risk to access their 
resources.  This approach allows for an overall more secure approach to providing 
services to end users taking into account existing vulnerabilities on the Internet.  The risk 
number turned out to be a useful predictor of whether an identity was valid. 
7.1 FINDINGS 
There are three main findings that can be drawn from this research. First, an 
identity attribute’s chances of compromise are strongly related to connectivity the 
attribute to other attributes. The experiments related to Research Question 1:Which 
attributes of Identity are most trusted? demonstrated that by using social graph 
preference techniques, empirical data can be represented about how identity attributes are 
compromised using an attribute to acquire other attributes. From these experimental 
results, it can be determined that the technique applied to assess the Probability of 
Compromise and the top most compromised attributes is useful in assessing how data is 
breached and the identity attributes most likely to be breached.  In comparison to the 
Verizon 2013 data breach report [48], this dissertation research agreed with 6 of the 10 
most compromised attributes identified by Verizon. The attribute analysis approach was 
also determined to be repeatable and can evolve as the understanding of identity thieves 
evolves in the Center for Identity Threat Assessment and Prediction (ITAP) data set. 
Also, identity providers could use these techniques to more effectively collect identity 
attributes for authentication and more effectively secure the identity attributes they 
collect.   
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Second, trust is a good predictor of identity.  The experiments related to 
Research Question 2: Can the reliability and authenticity of an identity in a transaction 
help demonstrate trust to an identity? demonstrated that by applying authenticity and 
reliability measures to sets of identity data, it is possible to quantify the trust in a 
particular identity based on its attributes.  An identity is determined to be more authentic 
as it presents more correct attributes.  The research also substantiates that reliability is a 
good predictor of identity based on the number of similar transactions conducted.  An 
identity that has both high authenticity and reliability tends to be most likely to be trusted 
and correct. From these experimental results it can be determined that authenticity and 
reliability are good predictors of trust.  The probability of a user being authentic 
correlated directly with number of valid users in the experiments.  The probability of a 
user being reliable correlated directly with the number of valid users in the experiments.  
Neither authenticity nor reliability however by themselves provided a strong correlation 
to the number of valid users.  Thus risk was introduced in the next research question to 
overcome those limitations.  Further experimental results demonstrated that the degree of 
authenticity and the degree of reliability were both positively correlated with the amount 
of attributes used during transactions.  They were also positively correlated with the 
amount of transactions conducted.  Practically an identity provider could apply these 
findings by requesting more attributes to gain a higher level of trust in a user.  Today 
some identity providers require additional information to more positively identify a user 
but there is no quantifiable model as to how much information to collect about a user.  
Also, this research finds that requesting more transactions can also drive a higher level of 
trust in a user.  Increasing the number of transactions is not typically applied in the 
identity space as a method to increase trust.  Identity providers could establish 
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mechanisms that forced a certain level of transactions in order to gain a higher degree of 
trust in their end users.    
Third, this dissertation concludes that risk is a strong predictor of identity 
compromise.  The experiments related to Research Question 3: Is the risk posed by an 
identity a reliable predictor of the validity of the identity? Demonstrated that each 
component of trust by itself was positively correlated with risk.  Those positively 
correlated components included: Authenticity, Reliability, Compromise and Improved 
Reliability.    When combined with each other and the probability that an attribute is 
compromised, the prediction accuracy significantly increased.   From these experimental 
results it can be determined that risk can predict 72% of valid and invalid identities for a 
given set of transactions using experimental data.  This result is significant because the 
existing mechanisms would assume each of these identities was valid based solely on 
their authorization thus grant the user (the identity) access.  Adding a risk identification 
methodology would give service providers greater confidence about how risky the users 
are that access their data.  Further, the experimental results demonstrate no need for the 
definition of consequence.  Existing risk methodologies explored required some 
knowledge of the data being accessed in order to define the risk to that data.  This finding 
turns that on its head by choosing the riskiness of the user accessing the data.  The 
flexibility gained allows service providers to use a identity-centric risk metric to 
determine data security by not giving risky users access in the first place and; thus, not 
having to determine the very difficult estimation of the consequence of data release.   
7.2 LIMITATIONS 
Although this research proves the research questions posed, there are limitations 
to how far reaching the conclusions are to be used.  The first limitation is the extent to 
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which the dataset can be interpreted.  There are approximately 350M people in the US as 
of 2014.  The dataset sampled 50K of these people yielding a representative sample of 
.014%.  Statistically this sample size yields a confidence interval of .25 with a 95% 
confidence level.  Although the work is considered statistically significant, the 
confidence level could increase with a larger dataset.   
Another limitation is the lack of real transaction data.  As discussed in RQ2, the 
transaction data was structured following the patterns used by US Department of 
Homeland Security for testing of its systems.  While it is unclear what assumptions made 
in the construction of this data, it is possible that some techniques used might introduce 
bias.  While Miller, et al.[92] was very clear about the source of data and the composition 
of it at a macro level(as mentioned above) he didn’t describe certain aspects.  One was 
how he chose the record set from the 77 million decedents inside the master data file.  
Was it a random sampling, if so how were the cultural constraints met?  This potential 
source of bias could lead to large amounts of people with same names or attributes that 
aren’t representative of the population.  The authenticity metric is dependent on those 
numbers.  For example, if an unusually large amount of Brian’s were chosen and Brian 
was used as an attribute in a transaction, that might bias the authenticity for that Identity 
to be lower.  Any other limitations that exist within this work are specifically discussed in 
the analysis of the experiments or data. 
7.3 FUTURE WORK 
It is possible to extend this work in the future to develop more accurate and 
precise models of identification.  The first and foremost area that deserves more research 
is the categorization and modeling of attributes.  While researching RQ1, it became clear 
that almost anything could be an attribute as long as it fits the criteria listed.  Thus 
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relationships can grow large and complex.   The modeling strategy though, constrains this 
model to a tractable set of attributes.  These attributes can be found, recorded, and 
modeled.  The larger this model grows, the more precise the probabilities for compromise 
will be.  The Center for Identity at the University of Texas has a program called ITAP 
that continually mines new attributes and relates them to each other in a model.   
Another research opportunity is to consider attribute values more deeply.  This 
research only looks for direct matches of attributes and it does not account for probable 
matches.  For example, there are multiple spellings or nicknames of Brian- Bryan, Bri, 
Bry, etc.  These potentially have the same meaning and refer to the same identity record 
in the identity store.  Semantic ontologies have the ability to find probabilistic matches of 
these attribute values.  These probabilities could build on top of the existing trust and risk 
algorithms to increase accuracy of the results without increasing the likelihood of false 
positives. 
Finally, another area of research in business risk could be employed.  Many risk 
models incorporate the dimension of Impact of an event.  For example, it is possible that 
the risk values go up for certain identities based on who they are, how connected they are, 
or what types of access they have.  These are all important factors to consider as an 
Identity provider who uses identity for many different types of transactions.  
Introductions of this dimension could make the risk calculation a useful commercial tool 
for businesses. 
Transactions between users on the Internet require credentials that have a fixed 
number of attributes.  When these credentials are created, attributes such as Social 
Security number, mother’s maiden name, and address are used to validate them.  
Attributes are often lost, stolen or compromised. Once the attributes of an identity are 
compromised, anyone can assume that identity with benign or malicious purposes.  
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Traditional solutions to this problem are to increase the trust level of the authentication 
through multiple modes, such as biometrics or smartcard tokens.  This research shows 
that it is possible to increase trust of users without requiring these extra items.  Using 
only the attributes registered with an identity provider (e.g., address, zip code, name, etc.)  
It is possible to show how trusted a user is who presents an identity.  Further, the risk to a 
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